So long, I.am.NCO

As a concept, I.am.NCO was underpinned by the premise that the U.S. Army Noncommissioned Corps deserves an external body to guard the profession, just as the Bar Association does for lawyers and the Medical Association does for doctors. I think many agree with the idea, as long as it serves primarily as the north star, without competing agendas. It served its purpose but could not gain the traction to move from idea, start-up, and operation to full operation due to a number of factors. The two biggest are the change in national priorities and the lack of funding.

As such, the time has come to sunset the I.am.NCO project and widen my aperture. Though I am of the same mindset as before, this project will have to wait until another time or until another group of champions and stakeholders picks up the mantle. I would be glad to participate in either. Meanwhile, as a professional, I must keep up with the changing times. My interests have always extended beyond a single subject, and this next chapter gives me the opportunity to return more fully to the work I have enjoyed most throughout my life: research, writing, and curating material that helps preserve the military record and make it useful to others.

For roughly 45 years, my professional and personal work has repeatedly returned to those same activities. As a Soldier and senior enlisted leader, I studied the Army’s institutions, traditions, and leadership systems. As an author, editor, researcher, educator, entrepreneur, and volunteer, I have written books and articles, contributed to official Army history, helped preserve NCO heritage, participated in applied Army research, built digital collections, supported leader development, and worked with historical and preservation organizations. The subjects and formats have changed over time, but the thread has remained remarkably consistent: find worthwhile questions, examine the evidence, document what can be known, and leave something useful behind.

Military Research Group is the new home for that work.

The Military Research Group (MRG) will continue my record of contributions to Army NCO history, research, and curation, as it remains a field to which I expect to contribute for the rest of my life. It will also provide room for research into Army leadership and institutional development, military education, local, statewide, and national history, local military history, preservation, archives, and cemeteries. Some of my current and future projects will become books. Others may become essays, research notes, source studies, field reports, or simply a better-documented historical record.

The word “Group” does not refer to a staff or an organization of researchers. It reflects the collection of subjects I choose to pursue and curate under one banner. Those interests will evolve, and that is intentional.

The future of MRG is less about building another organization and more about creating the freedom to follow important and interesting questions wherever they lead. I hope that means more time in archives, libraries, museums, cemeteries, historic sites, and on the ground where events actually occurred. It means more writing, more reading, more travel, more primary-source research, and more opportunities to share discoveries along the way.

If you followed I.am.NCO because of an interest in Army leadership, the NCO profession, military history, or simply thoughtful research and writing, I hope you will stay.

The subject matter will broaden, but the approach will remain familiar: follow the evidence, ask better questions, write clearly, and preserve what is worth remembering.

This is not the end of I.am.NCO is as much the next evolution of the work behind it. Welcome to the Military Research Group.

Your humble servant,

Daniel K. Elder

Discourse¹  Noun: written or spoken communication or debate:

Verb: speak or write authoritatively about a topic: Similar: [discussion, conversation, talk, dialogue]

Discord²  disagreement between people: Similar: [strife, conflict, friction, hostility, disagreement, dissention, dispute]

As a retired Sr. NCO and an advocate for our Army and noncommissioned officer corps, I am vexed when I see negative attitudes from other senior noncommissioned officers sowing discord on social media. More specifically, sowing discord in some professional discussions or journal areas. This track has no use and doesn't relay anything useful other than hey, let's see how I can throw in a wrench here.

If you’re like me, I scan articles and journals to find an interesting topic that stirs my brain cells to try and learn or understand something. As an advocate, I regularly peruse professional journal articles to keep up with how the Army moves forward (or not). On the odd occasion, I will post a response to one of these articles. Generally, I would use an affirmative if I enjoyed the article and something like “That’s an interesting take on the subject” if I tend to disagree. What I see all too often is a poke in the eye if the reader disagrees. I’ve also seen a counter-poke by authors on several occasions. When you respond to something you’ve read on (insert media here), what are you trying to accomplish? Are you trying to say that you liked or disliked the piece, are you trying to elicit a response, or are you just trying to throw a wrench into the readers day?

Both Edges of the Verbal Sword

We’ve all seen both edges of the verbal sword here. When you choose to communicate what you think, are you doing it to start a conversation or open a dialogue, or are you trying to communicate your disagreement with the article? Both responses are appropriate, but you can do it better by trying to create or continue a genuine dialogue with others (see definitions above).

Using trending posts on multiple sites as a case study, I’ve found that discourse and discord seem to be how senior noncommissioned officers respond to a subject on various platforms. If you’re like me, you find it frustrating to read the threads and constantly run into those who want to inject discord into a troubling discussion rather than writing authoritatively about the topic (discourse). Generally, this happens from what I call the ‘grumpy group’ who say they are glad they're not in the Army anymore and don’t have to deal with it.’ Though it’s interesting that they would respond, being out of the Army and all yet they interject these thoughts…a lot. The second group of folks, whom I’ll call the ‘current experts,’ respond with the general accusation of ‘you’re not in the Army, don’t know what's going on, and you should stay out of it.’ I think that one tends to sting all of us greybeards because I spent 33 years doing what they’re doing, keep very current on the issues, and am trying to help with the Army’s legacy, as are hundreds of others. This group of advocates wants what's best for the Army – and takes time to try and write authoritatively about whatever the topic is, although the ‘grumpy group always seems to chime in.

Let me ask you grumpy experts a question – when was the last time you saw a senior Army officer post like I’m talking about? Not able to answer, right? It's because they write as professionals. If you consider yourself a professional – write like one.

Using a Professional Voice

In the world of social media, it’s given that there will be posters and responders who throw out what they are thinking without much thought. This is understandable; it is social media. But when on a professional forum or when discussing a sensitive subject, we all should understand that our professional voice is now doing the talking. Our professional discourse is more important than you may think, and undoubtedly, it reflects on our corps. My time is also my valuable resource, and sowing discord takes away my time.

I was reminded of all this by an article recently penned by the TRADOC Commander, GEN Gary Brito³. He said, “Professionals must first hold themselves accountable to the expectations of the profession… things like continuous self-development, ethical living, and professional sincerity.” I’d ask those who post to think about what they say in public and make it something of value for the group. I’m pretty sure you won’t listen, but hey, it’s worth a try.

CSM (Ret.) Lance Lehr

Lance is a retired command sergeant major and currently the Executive Director of the Institute for Advanced NCO Leadership (IamNCO), an independent think tank developed to conduct rigorous research, expert analysis, and offer policy recommendations for enlisted leader development. The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of IamNCO. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to voice@iamnco.org for consideration.

1.  Oxford Languages. (2024). Discourse. Retrieved August 16, 2024, from define       discourse - Search (bing.com)

2.  Oxford Languages. (2024). Discourse. Retrieved August 16, 2024, from define discord - Search (bing.com)

3.  Brito, G. (2024, August 23) AUSA. Commentary: Strong to the Core: Reflections on Maintaining a Professional Force. Retrieved August 24, 2024, from Strong to the Core: Reflections on Maintaining a Professional Force | AUSA

Proposed rank titles for sergeant major, a modified insignia for the SMA, and the addition of nominative sergeant major insignia. By Daniel K. Elder

In case you missed the news, A noteworthy change happened to the enlisted stripes of the Army recently when CSM John Raines took over the position of the SEA for the NGBC. It was a well-deserved honor that wasn’t historical since he was the seventh servicemember to serve in that position. What was significant was that he was the first enlisted Army member since the approval of separate and distinct rank insignia for the position, and he became the first soldier to wear these new stripes, adding another rank insignia to our collection. This was an earned selection for a citizen soldier of distinction.

The left sleeve of SEA NGBC John Raines with the new insignia was on display on Nov. 8, 2024, when he assumed his role as the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the National Guard Bureau Chief.

With the position came stripes quite like our Army sergeant major, sandwiched between three chevrons and arcs, the symbol of the National Guard, a distinct eagle surrounded by two stars. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act elevated the chief of the National Guard Bureau to the four-star rank of general and made the NGB Chief the 7^th member of the Joint Chiefs. It made sense that the senior enlisted advisor should be on par with other service chiefs, hence the new rank for the senior enlisted advisor. These are rotating assignments that trade between members of either the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard.

However, this new rank places the Sergeant Major of the Army, the senior enlisted soldier of THE Army, off-kilter, now having another soldier at the same rank as the SMA at the same position. Back when I made the recommendation for the rank of the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (SEAC) to include four stars surrounded by an eagle, I skipped three stars because the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) wears three stars, that it made sense the SEAC has four stars. The Chairman is the senior officer of the services, which follows suit, as the SEAC is the senior enlisted soldier. The SMA and SEA NGBC are peers, but age-wise, the Army is the senior service. Of course, the militia predates the Continental Army, but that is picking nits as the Republic didn’t exist then. So, what about it?

Add another Star to the SMA Rank

So now, this is a time that we place the rank of the SMA on par with the sea service and add a third star above the eagle, representing the SMA again as the highest enlisted soldier in the Army. And with a rank insignia on par with the Navy MCPON. And while we are shuffling ranks around, it’s time we recognize the 20-odd different levels of position, authority, and experience across the E-9 cohort and significantly add some insignia of distinction to nominative sergeants. I also recommend the addition of two new ranks, one for the major of nominative sergeants and another for sergeants majoring in command who serve at a general officer level. Now, we are cooking a new SMA rank, a unique insignia for sergeants major serving in general officer staff assignments, and a nominative sergeants major insignia for senior enlisted advisors to a commanding general. Can I get a hooah?

While this is underway, it is a great time to drop the confusing language of the command sergeant major and get back to the original intent of the command sergeant major program, which is to identify the sergeant major of the command. I wrote about the CSM naming convention, the first SMA, and his comments about creating the program. Not too long after, while reading an oral interview of the second Sergeant Major of the Army, he only spoke of “sergeants major of the command.” It is clear from some of the early thoughts on CSMs that the title has been a bit misleading, and my view is it causes more hassle than it is worth since words matter.

And though my points today talk about E-9 sergeant major, I only use that because my recommendations to warrant nominative sergeants major has yet to gain traction. I still believe that we owe senior E-9 NCOs a lasting pay increase at the 8C/8S level and should have the SecArmy warrant them beginning at W-3 for 1-2 star level Sgts. Maj; W-4 for 3–4-star Sgts. Maj; and W-5 for SEA- NGBC, SMA, and SEAC. But that is another ball of worms when you involve joint forces. I stand fast because we should offer pay increases that last into retirement for our top-tier NCO corps.

A sergeant major at battalion and brigade should be called just that, and the same at division and corps. Most division CSMs are labeled DCSM in routine correspondence, so it's not far-fetched to ID the BnCSM and BdCSM; likewise, they are all called sergeant majors. It’s in the naming, writing, and identification where the extra labels come in handy, knowing who is who in the zoo.

This is another recommendation that will rub many the wrong way, but it makes sense when you stand back and look at it objectively. If badge, insignia, and tab bloat are happening across the service in the name of transformation in contact, this change is just in time. Let's get back to calling a sergeant a sergeant and recognizing the increasing roles and responsibilities of the senior enlisted cohort.

CSM (Ret.) Daniel K. Elder

/topsarge

Dan is a retired command sergeant major and currently the Institute for Advanced NCO Leadership (IamNCO) Chair, an independent think tank developed to conduct rigorous research, expert analysis, and offer policy recommendations for enlisted leader development. The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of IamNCO. If you want to submit your commentary, please send your article to voice@iamnco.org for consideration.

Sergeants Major Academy Battle Staff NCO Course developers, instructors and graduates, Class 1-91.

[Ed. Note: This is a summary from a fuller monograph provided by NCO Leadership Center of Excellence Hall of Honor awardee SGM (Ret.) William Smolak, which is available in full at the bottom of this article.]

I completed the Sergeants Major Course (SMC) in 1987, Class 29. I was selected to stay at USASMA [Ed. note: now NCOLCoE] to help develop the Personnel and Logistics Course (P&L). It was a small team led by SGM Charles Steward. In addition to myself, team members included SGM Seth Fuller, SGM Thomas Gulick, SGM Robert Judd, and SGM Terry Trent. The new course would parallel the instruction of the [existing] Operations and Intelligence Course (O&I); however, the two courses would be separate entities. O&I began instruction in about 1986.

In 1989, General Carl Vuono, the Chief of Staff of the Army, ordered USASMA to replace O&I and P&L. I was selected to lead the team in developing and fielding the new course. The direction was not to merge or combine the two courses but to replace them with a new course, the Battle Staff NCO Course. The development included fielding a team of subject matter experts, procuring facilities and equipment, creating a five-year training plan, selecting a target audience, determining course content and length, developing new lessons, and providing an additional skill identifier (ASI) (2S) for soldiers who completed the course.

I took much of my direction from General Vuono and Sergeant Major of the Army Julius Gates. Both leaders were actively involved in developing the course to ensure that it provided NCOs with training relevant to their Tactical Operations Center (TOC) duties. This was a train-as-you-fight strategy to help soldiers understand doctrine and warfighting, and how it applied to the duties in the TOC and in garrison. During the two-year project, General Vuono charged Colonel Kenneth Simpson and Colonel Fredrick Van Horn, commandants of USASMA, with meeting his intent and delivering the Battle Staff NCO Course. Both commandants, during the development and delivery phases, provided guidance and resources to ensure that we successfully developed a course from which soldiers could benefit.

The development team comprised about 35 NCOs, including lesson writers, Command Post Exercise (CPX) developers, instructors, and support personnel. The cadre ranged from Sergeant First Class to Sergeant Major. Some of the cadre were assigned to operate and train selected students on the Battalion/Brigade Battle Simulator and the Maneuver Control System (MCS). This was the first NCO training course to include a battle simulator. In the late 1980s, battalion/brigade battle simulators were procured for significant facilities. One simulator was earmarked for Fort Bliss, Texas. The simulator required an air-conditioned building. Fort Bliss did not have an air-conditioned building that could house the simulator. The BSNCOC had an air-conditioned building. Therefore, the simulator was diverted to the BSNCOC, with the caveat that Fort Bliss units could also use the device.

Course content focused on NCO duties and responsibilities in a TOC. The course learning objectives were to develop Staff Sergeants through Sergeants Major as battle staff NCOs at battalion and higher-level assignments. The course would last six weeks, culminating in a three-day CPX. The course could train up to 160 students per class. Subjects include individual duties, map reading, graphics and overlays, decision-making, preparing, reading, and implementing operational orders. This presented quite a challenge since many NCOs had never seen an operations order, read a map, or prepared overlays. It was difficult and further complicated because in 1991, there was a lack of digital training equipment. Most everything was analog. Training was done with paper, overhead projectors, and whiteboards.

The intent was to prepare NCOs for TOC operations where each NCO knew or was familiar with the duties of the other NCOs in and associated with the TOC. Today, the objective is relatively the same: “…provides training that is relevant to missions, duties, and responsibilities assigned to staff NCOs working in battalion and higher positions, both on the battlefield and in garrison environments." (2024-bsncoc-trifold.pdf (army.mil)). The training also prepared NCOs to help officers in their operations and, in an emergency, temporarily carry out their duties. Well-trained Battle Staff NCOs could be valuable assets in a TOC and garrison. Imagine an NCO who was familiar with the tasks of the other NCOs in a TOC. An NCO who could help prepare briefings, read a map, and carry out assignments with little or no supervision, a Battle Staff NCO.

A battle-staff NCO

The course was set up to simulate a brigade environment. The students were assigned to battalion or brigade classrooms that represented a cross-section of their home duty assignments. There was an infantry classroom, an armor classroom, and more. The students included supply, personnel, operations, and intelligence NCOs with various military occupational specialties, all possessing experience and assignments in, for example, an infantry battalion or higher. Supply sergeants would be assigned to the infantry classroom if most of their assignments were with an infantry unit. Each classroom could include up to 16 students, allowing for up to four S1, S2, S3, and S4 NCOs. While the priority was to train battalion-level NCOs, the class also included NCOs from higher levels of command. If a brigade-level NCO was typically assigned to an infantry unit, that NCO could be included in the infantry classroom. Other classrooms would be set up similarly for specific combat arms, combat support, or combat service support units. A typical class might be designed with a tank-heavy classroom, a mechanized infantry room, an air defense room, or a field artillery room. The class aimed to mirror the battalion-level force structure.

The three-day CPX was carried out in a separate building designed to exercise and test students on what they had learned during the course. The CPX facility was originally part of the O&I Course and, before that, the USASMA Learning Resource Center. The wooden building contained track mock-ups with radios and camouflage netting. It was noisy, and it lacked air conditioning and heat. It was a loud and uncomfortable environment.

The battle simulator provided mock operations. The MCS provided loss information related to the battle simulator operations. The course was not designed to teach tactics, so during the CPX, student operators could make operational mistakes. Because of this, the student operators were not graded on their use of the simulator. The idea was to create a battlefield environment, determine what happened and what was needed, and then respond to the event. The maneuver control system provided detailed information about personnel and equipment losses. In turn, the students would react to this information and provide a response. For example, if a unit needed MEDEVAC, the students would try to provide that support.

The CPX took the students out of their classroom environment. The CPX included daily briefings and ended with exit briefings, an overview by the class senior NCO, supported by specifics from the operations, intelligence, logistics, and personnel NCOs. While most of the NCOs might not have yet participated in these briefings, the CPX helped expose them to what might be presented by their officers. It also provided the NCOs with knowledge that could help them support the officers in preparing the briefings. SGM Phil Cantrell developed the CPX. As far back as I can remember, he was part of the growth of the O&I Course and the BSNCOC. He created a superb product.

In addition to the cadre operators of the battle simulator and MCS, each classroom provided several NCOs to be trained to operate the simulator. The cadre was the opposing force, and the students were the friendly force. During the CPX, the student operators were exchanged with other operators in the TOC. This caused a temporary breakdown in TOC operations, which could be expected in real-time. Instructors would also remove some TOC operators or interfere with operations to determine how well students could adjust to the loss of fellow NCOs. Communications would be interrupted, and it was necessary to use runners to contact nearby units.

First Battle Staff NCO Course

The Battle Staff NCO Course’s initial offering was Class 1-91, which began instruction in January 1991. It consisted of nearly 20 instructors and about 150 students. The Class comprised Staff Sergeants, Sergeants First Class, Master Sergeants, and Sergeants Major. After Class 1-91, the team improved some of the lessons. Class 2-91 consisted of about 150 students, from Staff Sergeants to Sergeants Majors. In later years, the Sergeant Major was not included in the Battle Staff target population, as similar training would be included in the Sergeant Major Course.

The course was six weeks long, with six or perhaps seven classes per year. This provided the means to train the target population over a five-year period. The target population was limited to NCOs who were or would be assigned to operational roles in combat, combat support, and combat service units. This meant that not every NCO in the Army was eligible for training in the Battle Staff NCO Course. Graduating students would be awarded ASI 2S.

As the team lead, one of the challenges was to show the Army that a team of NCOs led by an NCO could respond to direction and develop the Battle Staff NCO Course. General Vuono was precise in his direction. He visited the Academy various times to be briefed about the course by me and to guide us on his intent. SMA Gates also provided guidance and interpretation of General Vuono's direction. I went on over a dozen trips, which included Washington, DC, Fort Leavenworth, Fort Monroe, Fort Bliss, and Germany. I participated in a two-week grading of a battalion/brigade CPX in Germany. I briefed various commands, including TRADOC, and at each location.

Battle Staff has evolved over the years to support changes in Army Doctrine. It is now a four-week course of instruction that soldiers from the three Army components, sister services, and international partner nations attend. The culminating event for the BSNCOC is a Combined Arms Rehearsal (CAR). The mission and subject matter remain relatively the same but are constantly updated to track changes within the force. Today, it is a different environment that requires different methods of instruction. I am proud to say that I was a small part of developing this course. I am proud of the team, their accomplishments, today's cadre, and the support they receive from the NCOLCoE. The BSNCOC continues to be a practical, functional course.

Download the full history here [ncohistory.com link]

SGM (Ret.) Bill Smolak

SGM Smolak was born in 1948 and entered the Army in July 1966. He retired in August 1991. He is from Auburn, New York. He married his wife Catsy in June 1968 and they reside in El Paso, Texas. Their daughter Natasha, her husband Jimmy, and grandson Noah live in Horizon City, Texas.

If you are wondering about the latest happenings at the only Think Tank focused on the Noncommissioned Officer, the Institute for Advanced NCO Leadership (IamNCO) is not standing still. We had our quinceañera-like coming-of-age celebration in September when we first announced the establishment of the Institute. And then, in October, we took it on the road when the Executive Director CSM (Ret.) Lance Lehr, Director of Education CSM (Ret.) With some help from our Director of Outreach CSM Phil Johndrow, Matt Lord and I descended on the annual Association of the United States Army to see and hear all the latest Army initiatives. Building an entirely new organization from scratch is challenging when resources are few, but there are examples of what we hope to become. But first, we must get our messaging right.

Getting Our Agenda Right

Think tanks play an essential role in setting research goals and a policy agenda and in prioritizing some subjects over others; that is where we have found ourselves. We have been studying what the inaugural board and directors believe are non-operational policy proposals that could enhance enlisted retention, relieve some of the burden on the Corps, and enhance the prestige of senior noncommissioned officers and the NCO Support Channel. Our staff of volunteers have banded together to make twenty-two recommendations for consideration to set a platform on which the Institute is to be founded. Now, we would appreciate your help defining our top issues for the betterment of the NCO Corps.

This Veterans Day weekend is a perfect time for reflection and honoring the sacrifice of our military and their veterans. It is also a time for you to contribute a few moments to help us rank and order some of the subjects our team came up with. It is not a pretty list and isn’t perfect, but it is a start. The top priorities are only our initial topics and will help us focus our resources, energy, and research toward deemed necessary objectives. It also gives us goals; we need to crowd-source what is essential to NCOs today.

Here is the ask. Click on this link and go to our totally anonymous survey. Then, rank the 22 issues from the priority of importance to you to the last. Is something missing on the list, or would you like to add something for consideration? Then, could you comment here on the Substack article and tell us what you think? We cannot be an organization for NCOs if we do not listen to the voices, so we need your help.

If you'd like to go right to the survey, you can do that now by clicking here. You’ll need to review some of the suggested topics below and rank them in order from the link below. You may notice in the actual survey there is a single entry that says something else; feel free to order that for the one burning issue you think is missing and then comment below. We need 500 responses by Tuesday so that we would appreciate your help now. All you have to do is click the link, use your mouse to grab a topic, and move it up or down the list until you rank and order them all. Then, hit the green submit button. It’s that easy. And it’s anonymous.

Jotform Survey Questions

You can get a glimpse of some of the suggested topics below, and the list is not all-inclusive. Some may be a bridge too far, and some may not be aggressive enough. You tell us. They are in no particular order.

1. Advocate that the Secretary of the Army warrant the Sergeant Major of the Army

2. Recommend the Army develop a structured mentorship program

3. Suggest the Army codify in policy the NCO Corps as a distinctly separate Army cohort

4. Recommend the Army develop a way to make decentralized leadership a reality

5. Expand the role of NCOLCoE at Bliss as the NCO Corps proponent and as a direct report to the Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army

6. Determine how to streamline administrative burdens (Process improvement and Digital tools)

7. Strengthen the profession by balancing Traditional Roles with New Responsibilities

8. Advocate that Commandant positions of Regimental NCOAs should be nominative positions

9. Form an independent study to investigate the current and future roles and responsibilities of the NCO Support Channel

10. Conduct research to identify the right priorities for tasks that, by being scaled back or deleted, will provide more time dedicated to warfighting skills and skill enhancement for soldiers

11. Advocacy for NCO concerns: pay, benefits, support for families

12. Ensure the Army Maintains Leadership in a Joint/Multinational Force Environment

13. Community engagement with the broader military community, including other NCOs, officers, and enlisted personnel, to promote collaboration, knowledge-sharing, and mutual support among military ranks

14. Move SGM-A to Ft Leavenworth and petition Congress to afford it Title 10 USC 7371 authority and compensation for its faculty

15. Recruitment and Retention

16. Adapting to Technological Advancement/Evolution

17. Influence Navigating Ethical and Moral Dilemmas

18. Advocate for Rank-centric AI-facilitated exit interview with all NCOs upon ETS or retirement

19. Advocate for professional development opportunities such as training programs, workshops, and mentorship opportunities

20. Secure funding for 12-month post-exit Rank-centric AI-facilitated follow-up with all NCOs upon ETS or retirement

21. Expand the Role of NCOs in Strategic Decision-Making

22. Provide pay parity for nominative senior enlisted leaders that last into retirement

Thank you for taking the time to help us with this survey, and we salute you.

/topsarge

CSM (Ret.) Daniel K. Elder,

Chairman, IamNCO

After a year in the making the IamNCO team got it's paws on a first run edition of the newest Blue Book during the AUSA annual meeting. Thanks to the connection of one of our Fellows, a few of us got a sneak peek ahead of Tuesday's unveiling. But yesterday, we held one of the first 300 paper copies in our hands for the first time right after SMA Weimer announced the released.

We must say, as soon as we heard the concept and saw the product(s), it was a fast reminder on how short our corps institutional memory is, and that previous generations of NCOs have plowed these fields at least once before. I asked myself, why do we keep finding ourselves backpedaling towards lessons we learned pre911 instead of advancing from what we already knew? It only took a moment to see that the answer was in the mission, vision and goals of IamNCO. Let me explain.

Before there was a Facebook, USAWTF or Reddit, the world was going digital and getting connected. Beginning in the mid-1990s there was a proliferation of a mishmash of websites, online conversation "forums," and portals of information that were disconnected and not easily accessible. Yahoo was king and people were just hearing about this thing called Google, and specialty sites like Armytimes.com and Military.com were not even a glimmer. Army digital content existed, but was too hard to find for the typical soldier, and we were not integrated.

Though Arny transformation was underway, it took a team of innovative NCOs and I who actually built the first generation of a "one stop shop" of resources of importance to Army NCOs through a grass roots project called Squadleader.com. like today Blue Book, it was more than just a website, this staffed multipurpose portal had interactive conversations, tools, SOPs, templates, PowerPoints, and checklists.

We built a community of practices of professional dialog that incorporated attributable dialog and conversation, TTPs, lessons learned, forums, link trees, and directories. It even innovated live chats with nominative CSMs who would provide mentoring sessions open to the entire force. That was if you registered and signed up to identify yourself, this was not anonymous feedback. It was revolutionary.

We operated on the fringes, self-guided and led by consensus. Though I was the "top sarge" of the team, my 2IC was a staff sergeant who helped establish a panel of "peer mentors" who moderated an online community of over 20,000 multi compo NCOs. We were the only game in town before social media and became ipso facto the unofficial "voice" of the NCO corps.

Monitored by junior and senior leaders of all cohorts alike, our community was turned to by many in the Army, private to colonel, for recent and relevant content.

Unaffiliated, but with parallel thought, a few years later three captains came up with a similar concept and formed companycommand com. Ironically, they became the "darlings" of Army digital communication of the era. Though we attempted a companion site to collaborate with theirs for company leaders called firstsergeant.com, it would not be until post 911 that we would finally be able to sync our efforts.

Weeks after one of the first major sustained battles in Afghanistan at Tora Bora, the newly redesigned NCOTeam.org had a 1SG from one of the 101st Division aviation assets who were in contact, host a live chat describing lessons learned and the emerging roles of his NCOs during that battle. By then we were discussing in the clear RSOI issue, prepping our units for future operations, and other TTPs well outside prudent OPSEC concerns. Look, it was the aughts and well before the threat we experienced today.

The Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) had kicked into high gear. They recognized that technology could close some of the knowledge gaps in ways to quickly get TTPs from CTCs and emerging battlefields to the force and saw professional forums like squadleader and companycommand as both an avenue, and a threat. Firewalls were a new defensive perimeter we were just considering and our adversaries were tuning in to our conversations.

These innovation centers were all the rage throughout the earliest days of the global war on terror, so much so that sergeant major of the Army Jack Tilley established a pilot program to institutionalize squadleader to morph into an official NCO.mil. After trials for almost a year, it became NCOTeam org, the official forum for the Army NCO Corps. The Army created the Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) in an attempt to consolidate a number of likeminded professional communities under the direction of a professionals that consisted of Army leaders and their staff, and trained community facilitators and subject matter experts in how to moderate professional dialog.

In 2005 I formally donated squadleader to the Sergeants Major Academy, and handed the keys of arguably the most successful forum to be run by professionals, but under the Army umbrella. For almost 10 years the Army forums chugged along providing measured value to NCOs, but new shiny objects came along every year to compete. In typical fashion, a contractor bid a software platform to host NCOmil that was as bad as AKO, and NCOs lost trust in the new forums, by then run by contractors. Plus, the same NCO forums that we had successfully ran on a shoestring budget, struggled under the weight of million-dollar contracts. MILSuite, Reimer Library, and other training related platforms like DTMS and the like became higher priority.

In 2015 SMA Chandler announced the Army could no longer afford NCOmil, which still had a dashboard homepage with announcements, crosscut highlights from other sub sections, and consolidated links to important NCO focused resources that be had from the beginning, highlighting NCO job aids and tools. NCO.mil was defunded and soon after BCKS collapsed, and so did all professional forums. And so, online dialog went to the gutters, and now unprofessional and led by anonymous rabble rousers.

This is not an article about the Blue Book or today's priorities and innovations, we hail and support our SMAs efforts to make serving as a modern enlisted leader easier. This is a conversation about how we can better establish continuity and a long range strategy for an NCO corps that can endure more than two cycles of senior enlisted leaders.

Today, the senior enlisted councils who envision the strategy for the future NCO never seem to have the legs to see their ideas through. 36 months dwell can help, but reality still sets in. Most of today's SEC are unaware of this history and have no collective memory of these innovations. Therin lies our problem.

This week SMA Weiner spoke of the rollercoaster effect that today's NCOs endure, and this is another example of rows that were hoed by NCOs long before him. NCOs of the past were faced with similar problems, came up with innovative solutions like we always do, and then our initiatives are axed when budgets are cut, or nextgen leaders’ step into positions not seeing previous patterns.

IamNCO is an initiative to provide the same type of guided continuity from outside the institution by carefully vetted professionals in a similar manner that NCO.mil invented, for the good of the noncommissioned corps. If we don't do this now, two or three generations from later when the Blue Book will be long gone having been replaced by the shiny new autonomously automated ChatNCO augmented by virtual reality, that sounds like another community of practice. And so, there we will go again.

/topsarge

CSM (Ret.) Dan Elder, Chairman

IamNCO

We wanted to remind you that the team of IamNCO are rolling out our mission, vision and goals this week during the 2024 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) annual meeting at the Walter Washington Convention Center in Washington DC. If you are in attendance, be sure to seek out our chairman Dan Elder, Executive Director Lance Lehr, or our Director of Education Matt Lord, if you want to engage with this first of its kind NCO-focused research and policy center. We will be talking with NCOs gathering feedback, ideas, and issues, so be sure to tell us your thoughts about how this center can support future initiatives and issues that are important to the force.

We will also be listening to senior Army leaders discuss policies affecting the enlisted population, specifically all three components of the total Army, and how they impact our profession. We hope to engage in face-to-face dialog with current and past noncommissioned officers and we seek to establish relevance and plan our actions. The first day so far has been one of great hope, and we look forward to seeing more of what the future has in store for our Army NCOs.

Figure 1. IamNCO Research and Policy Institute Capability Statement

What we are all About

As the United States Army Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) think tank, IamNCO can serve several valuable functions. Here are some we believe we can fulfill on behalf of enlisted leaders:

1. Professional Development: An NCO think tank can focus on enhancing the professional development of NCOs within the Army now, other services and other nations eventually. We can develop or recommend programs, resources, and initiatives to support the growth, education, and training of NCOs, ensuring enlisted men and women possess the necessary skills, knowledge and resources to excel in their roles.

2. Policy Analysis and Recommendations: The think tank can conduct research and analysis on policies affecting NCOs and provide recommendations to Army leaders and influencers to improve enlisted working conditions, career progression, compensation, and overall welfare. We can offer insights to inform the development of Army policies that impact NCOs directly.

3. Mentorship and Guidance: An NCO think tank can establish mentorship programs, like Core Compass, and develop platforms where experienced NCOs can provide guidance, advice, and support to junior NCOs. This function would facilitate knowledge sharing, leadership development, and the cultivation of strong, professional relationships within the NCO corps.

4. Best Practices Sharing: The think tank can serve as a central point for archiving and sharing best practices and lessons learned among NCOs. We could collect and disseminate successful strategies, tactics, and techniques used by NCOs across different units and areas of expertise. This would foster a culture of continuous improvement and collaboration.

5. External voice of the NCO Corps: The think tank can represent the collective voice of NCOs within the Army from outside the boundaries of the institution. We can facilitate open dialogue between NCOs and higher-ranking officers, as well as engage with policymakers and decision-makers to ensure NCO perspectives are considered in policy formulation and decision-making processes.

6. Research and Innovation: The think tank can conduct research on emerging challenges, trends, and technologies relevant to the NCO corps. We can explore innovative approaches, tools, and methods that can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of NCOs in their duties. This function would contribute to the Army's ability to adapt and respond to evolving operational requirements.

7. Advocacy and Recognition: The think tank can advocate for the recognition and appreciation of the vital role NCOs play in the Army. We can raise awareness of NCO contributions, highlight their achievements, and advocate for appropriate recognition and rewards for their service.

Many of these functions are already done within the constraints of the instution, and within the boundaries of the the oath of enlistment, the NCO Creed, DoD and Army policy, the NCO Support Channel and the Chain of Command, and the Constitution. Without a doubt the NCO Corps is loyal to the officers and the Commander in Chief they serve, IamNCO is loyal specifically to the NCO Corps.

NCOs, will you join us in this mission?

CSM (Ret.) Daniel K. Elder

/topsarge

You read some columnists in the newspapers; you have to wonder who they are really working for. You can see they have an agenda. -Alec Baldwin

The title today comes from Albert Einstein, I just hacked it for this week’s substack mostly because after taking a week off from our revelation of the first-ever NCO focused think tank, I have spent some time thinking about what it is this collaborative effort is going to be about. Though I may have been a lead instigator in pulling together infrastructure and attempting to hammer out the why and how, to be frank now that we have arrived at this point we are not much different than we were 2 weeks ago. That is because there has been no ACTION, and without action, we are nothing. So, the big question we asked ourselves was, action on what?

If research is the cornerstone of a think tank, one must ask what timely topics have the leadership and directors of this institute chosen to focus on in our infancy? But more importantly, not only what is it we choose to study, but with what resources will we use to conduct that research? That is our current juncture, we are finding ourselves with the ol “chicken or the egg” dilemma, what comes first? That is because in many centers like ours, research is done in-house by a team of researchers and their supporting elements, or the research is driven by the institute, but conducted externally by a network of collaborators and experts. For our first year we have taken a hybrid approach of a small team of volunteers, supported by a few fellows, and so it is now time to get after it. We may not have much by way of resources, but we have to press on.

Getting After It

So, I have been telling the team, okay, let’s go. move,em. get’long. Head out! let us roll. Giddyap. I mean we want to d something, but what? What seems to be missing right now for us is clarity on what is the “it?” If we want to get after “it", we need to be in agreement with what “it” actually is, and for me right now I feel the number one challenge is to establish the issues we hope to address through the creation of an Agenda. If you have been following my earlier substacks you may have noticed a few threads or pet peeves that I myself have espoused, and some have had many advocates and a few left and right head shakers. Some thought the topic valid, but the message (or the messenger) was off. Or a whole host of other feedback that came along (trust me, it is a gift).

It is my belief that if I am not careful at this stage I.am.NCO could easily veer off to “Dan’s thing,” which was a similar risk I had building the first-ever NCO focused community of practice. Let be known, like then, I have no agenda, other than for the NCO corps to be better. Then the key for me was our “it” to become self-guiding without a single leader, and that is how I see we must proceed again. We did that by enlisting the help of a diverse group of NCOs from across the Army of divergent backgrounds, grades, MOSes, and locations to serve in a board of directors like role. I called them “peer mentors.” These were the early adopters and most serious of the contributors. They espoused the type of values we expected of our community, were helpful, not harmful, and were all good team players. To me, that was how you build a team in that environment, and our think tank must organize similarly, and we were never seen as a threat. Most importantly, we were AUTONOMOUS. Actually, we were so much the opposite of a threat that the insitution actually drew us in to join them and we lost that autonomy, and then they killed it, like what could happen here.

Issue Generation

For the next month we will be focusing on generating issues by collecting feedback using a structured approach. Up to this point we have been holding brainstorming sessions where board members and directors have been discussing issues or concerns. Just in building up to this point we conducted a SWOT analysis to outline and structure the institute, and to establish our mission, vision, and goals. We had to let other factors influence our timelines, but once we achieved each of the required steps it allowed us to get to the place we are now. And that place right now is Issue Generation. Without an established customer, that is, a customer besides the broader institution of enlisted leaders in that thing we call the NCO corps, we must establish an Agenda making up issues that support our mission. And to do that, we will need the help of the community.

I have asked the volunteer board and directors that before our next board meeting to bring 3-5 topics, issues, challenges to lay out on the table as we begin to gather the top 20-30 of the hottest topics, and begin to whittle down as we create a list of items that we decide to establish as our 2025 Agenda. But we do not plan to operate in a vacuum. If you would like to throw some thoughts in our suggestion box, you are encouraged to take part and answer a short three question in an unscientific survey. In it, we ask for your short definition of the duties of the NCO, what is one critical issue or challenge facing the NCO corps today, and what would you like to see the Institute accomplish in 2025?

We will be fleshing out topics influenced by other work our team does, we are more than a couple of old soldiers sitting at the back of a room. Our personnel have established enough touch points back to the Corps that we have a sense of the challenges and barriers the force is faced with, so continue to stay tuned here and engage with your own discourse and dialog.  We see you, we are listening. And, you can always tap the comment button below or reach out to us at experts@iamnco.org to have your voice heard more direct, or join us in our efforts. See you next week.

CSM (Ret.) Dan Elder

/topsarge

Photograph courtesy U.S. Army from the 2022 Year in Photos collections. This one titled simply, Arlington Honors, and is a cropped versin of the orginal.

"Those who stand for nothing, fall for anything" - Alexander Hamilton

This week after much planning and preparation seven Soldier-for-Life retirees came together and made the decision to step from the shadows and proceed on a plan to help empower our NCO corps in an enduring way. With almost 200 years of combined experience from across the spectrum of the enlister leader continuum, the reputation of this group of volunteers is that we are products of a culture we hope to sustain, all with an eye to the future. Joining us are three early adopters who have accepted fellowships to help us jumpstart this unique effort that has never been tried before; an NCO-focused think tank by NCOs, for NCOs, and run by NCOs. So, what’s the big deal?

Since the days of old, sergeants and corporals were simply first line enlisted leaders akin to blue collar foremen who rose up from ranks and were put in charge of their men with nothing special besides a dollar of pay more and an angled piece of cloth to distinguish them from their men. But NCOs were not given much credit.  In the Secretary of War approved 1814 Hand Book for Infantry, William J. Duane wrote “…"the chance of finding non commissioned officers who can clearly comprehend and explain the principles of a good discipline is not one in twenty; from which cause it is twenty to one that the recruits are imperfectly or erroneously taught." It would not be until the final days of the Vietnam war with the scepter of a manning crisis brough about by the ending of the draft that forced the services to improve conditions for the enlisted ranks. And since 1973, minus some tweaks and adjustments, the systems created then around the top three Army grades remain vaguely the same.

Granted, there is no crisis in the ranks today, especially at the squad and platoon level of enlisted leadership, or at least it is not for the sergeant. Company level leadership is pretty much the same as it always has been, and probably how it will always be. It’s really all the other ash and trash NCO positions outside of the clean lines of mission command that are disjointed, and we as a community cannot seem to be able to agree on what right looks like. And the fact that our enlisted leaders end up on the merry-go-round in and out of operational, institutional and broadening assignments that we end up with a corps of generalists. There are exceptions of course, but there are not as many specialists in our ranks as in days gone by. As a result, our systems like personnel management, military education, examinations, evaluations, promotions shift with the winds that the people holding those positions ride in on. It’s exhausting for soldiers today, enlisted and officer.

Let us be clear, our belief is there is a systematic shortcoming, and it is not necessarily the leaders serving now, or in the past. The well thought out NCO structure instituted in the wake of Vietnam was built around the Cold War analog era Army where careerists were the opposite of the more diverse draftee population, and typically were less educated and thought of as more the muscle and less the brains behind an operation. Up to then the best and brightest NCOs were commissioned as Mustangs, or they bootstrapped their way to college and came back as commissioned officers. To be an NCO, high school education was optional and military or civilian education took away from the mission. Not many were able to, or aspired to, higher learning. But that has changed significantly over time, but the major underpinning of enlisted systems hasn’t. We believe that after the multiple Year of the NCO and investments made in leader development it is time to relook the fundamental role of NCOs above the company level, and we suggest more is not necessarily the betteror only outcome.

We don’t seek platitudes, and we realize that sometimes the rotten smell is in our own fridge. Lately, it’s in fashion to call out the role of the senior Army NCO and for good reason. But, for the uninitiated who do not fully understand the nuances of the noncommissioned officer support channel and the fact that the changing authority and responsibilities around their roles is a feature and not a bug contribute to todays culture. This little group working as a not-for-profit effort is not going to change the world and is not meant to. But in reading our Mission, Vision and Goals we hope not to simply stand by and point things out like a credit monitoring service, but to help drive professional dialog, conduct deep research and investigation to the challenges facing noncommissioned officers, and present thought provoking and unbiased solutions.

In the coming months we will be asking the community to help us in our efforts to define the enduring principles of the Army noncommissioned officer, principles that belong to the almost 250-year legacy of the men and women who have worn the rank of corporal and sergeant, and that will last for future generations. Army leaders are merely stewards of the offices they hold now and, in the future, and do not possess ownership. It must be the profession that manages its culture and heritage while holding its constituents accountable. Being a part of a profession doesn’t have an ETS or retirement date but is inside everyone who truly lives up to their commitment. Join us, and let’s get it right.

CSM (Ret.) Daniel K. Elder, Chairman

/toparge

Last week was an interesting week for my version of conversation discussing the noncommissioned officer leader. I was a part of a few spirited debates around a few of my recent posts here on Substack, one since deleted topic that was debated in private social media circles. Buried at the bottom of the thread was an innocuous comment that said something to the effect of: that is fine and good, but who is willing to put their personal reputation on the line and invest the time to do something about it? It was a rhetorical question sure, but one worthy of revisiting, because today a few of us are putting some skin in the game. Actually, six visionary Soldier’s for Life and I have been working for almost two years on creating an independent NCO-focused 501(c)3 nonprofit research & policy institute, the Institute for Advanced NCO Leadership, to serve as an anchor point for capturing the traditions of the NCO Corps from outside of the institution.

In the 3d Quarter 2011 Joint Forces Quarterly Colonel Matthew Moten, USA, wrote “Who Is a Member of the Military Profession?” where he laid out his views and definitions of professions in general, but particularly asking if being an NCO was akin to being a part of a profession, like a plumber, an electrician, or a pipefitter are in professions. In reading the article I was able to check the boxes in many of the points he made minus one, and that was, having an “autonomous jurisdiction over a body of professional knowledge.” He was right, the NCO corps is missing that , and we believe that gap is a symptom that is affecting our profession today. Our appeal is that today’s career professional enlisted leader needs a set of unwavering essential customs and conventions that remain as enduring characteristics of our community.

My past writings have tried to argue that an independent institution is in fact curating NCO Corps wisdom and heritage, but I could only find them from within the Army enterprise. Yes, there are a few great membership-based veteran and service organizations that we think highly of, AUSA, NCOA and EANGUS to name but a few. But their agendas are not crafted in the way as Moten’s article intended and the NCO Corps as a “profession” does not have a disciplined knowledge system outside of the organization that is minding our mores and values, and investigating future initiatives.

We believe that leaving jurisdiction of the truisms and culture of the NCO as a profession to the institution runs the risk of becoming a cult of personality, especially considering that by design our own NCO strategy is “nested in the guidance and vision of our leaders." Beacuse of that, our habits are changing all the time. Asking the institution to guard our intellectual achievements is how Germans say, “den Bock zum Gärtner machen,” or “hiring a goat as the gardener.” After much thought and a lot of conversation, a few professionals (and friends) and I set out in 2022 on “Project Dobol” named after CSM (Ret.) Theodore (Ted) Dobol, the first NCO promoted to sergeant major. This project is about getting to our roots.

For this initiative we created a not-for-profit “think tank” similar to other Army think tanks, like the Combat Studies institute (Command and General Staff College), the Strategic Studies Institute (War College), and the Modern War Institute (West Point), but this one is to solely focus on the enlisted leader. Today we proudly announce that the Institute for Advanced NCO Leadership, or I.am.NCO, is a living, breathing entity.

We have gone through the legal steps to create a start-up, and we espouse our mission, vision and goals, so consider this our initial communication gesture. But know, our core purpose is that we have organized exclusively “to conduct rigorous research, expert analysis, and offer policy recommendations for enlisted leader development.” Read our introductory message on our website at iamnco.org. Today’s message here on this NCO Guide Substack will be my final as over the next few days this will transition to become I.am.NCO and serve as a repository for NCO discourse and thought-provoking initiatives.

Bear with our team as we follow the tried-and-true method of crawl, walk run, at this juncture as we stand upright and proudly stride into the next phase of the project. Our behind-the-scenes team have begun to assimilate a number of enduring NCO initiatives that began with squad-leader.com, Battle Command Knowledge System, the NCO Historical Society and the NCO Guide. A recently was our Fellowship program and a new collaboration with other subject matter experts and organizations. Our Board of Directors have been pushing the volunteers toward action, which you may see as you explore our online hub.

This total effort will allow for a recoupment of the investments made by our nation in the education and development of the modern enlisted leader. But realize that our capability to conduct NCO-focused applied research using our patented methodologies© is limited as now our next stage is to generate capability and resources. Our number one effort will be in securing adequate funding through a series of targeted enterprises and collaborations that will engage our subject matter expert community. Stand by for great things to come.

CSM (Ret.) Daniel K. Elder

/topsarge

Army quarterback Trent Steelman (#8) dives into the end zone for a 1 - yard touchdown in the first quarter of their game against Northwestern in Michie Stadium at the United States Military Academy in West Point, NY. on Saturday, September 17, 2011. Steelman had three rushing touchdowns as Army defeated Northwestern 21 - 14. CHET GORDON/Times Herald-Record Times Herald-Record

Not in my Squad. This is My Squad. Standards and Disciple. Sound familiar? If you have been in the Army even for a little while you may recall these as key themes from the top, priorities of effort from the senior enlisted advisors of the Army. Each one is good and was (and is) important for their time and was a part of their messaging. After spending years amongst that august group and watching and listening to them operate, their words remained consistent throughout their tenure, ebbing and flowing with current events and the changing time. I should know a little about how the poeople in that position operate, I literally wrote the book (CMH Pub 70-63-1) on the Sergeants Major of the Army (as general editor for v2, the only enlisted editor).

And it seemed to me that each of them recognized they were stewards of that office…while they came and went the concept of the Office of the Sergeant Major of the Army (OSMA) was that they were a representative of the enlisted force directly advising the Chief of Staff of the Army (and the DA Staff). Originally considered an “Ombudsman” like role, it has changed over time and is one that is recognized at the top of the noncommissioned officer support channel. But with the position comes the realization that each SMA is going to come in with their own theme that may be a bit different from their predecessor. It’s a feature, not a bug, that is how the system is designed.

Flexible is not Enduring

Unfortunately, the whipsaw nature of changing priorities for NCOs can mess with an organization, especially when you have been heading left for a while, and now you need to turn a bit to the right. The Army is big, and “steering the ship” is a complicated endeavor.  Sure, the Army changes, but shouldn’t the fundamentals remain constant? The Army’s mission and purpose is grounded, and it remains constant. This We’ll Defend. Shouldn’t that be the same for the NCO corps? Well, in my view, you not only need mission, vision and goals, but you need a strategy. And this week that is the pain point. Kinda the bottom line, up middle. Yeah, when I write I tend to bury the lede, but I eventually get there.

I returned back to the civilian sector years ago and entered the rough and tumble world of founding and running a GovCon firm. Early on in the build phase I had to sit down and really focus on what my mission, vision and goals were. I needed a roadmap to help decide how to establish operations and build and grow my company. I conducted a SWOT analysis and knew I needed to write out a plan. I’m not a fan of the business plan way of thinking, Instead I followed the Business Model Canvas approach (affiliate link). For me this master plan was my fundamental strategy and would not change over time. It’s a long-term plan that guides me. Though it is not  etched in stone, I do not keep going back and mix things up, I continue along with slight course corrections.

So, what’s the point you ask? Before I remind you of the current NCO Strategy I have to touch on the NCO Vision, last seen in the 2002 edition of TC 7-22.7, the Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide. I am probably jaded because I was a part of the workgroup of over 60 senior enlisted leaders that came up with that vision, it was developed in collaboration with RAND for evaluating NCO leader development systems. The intent of the vision “was to articulate enduring characteristics of Army NCO” and to use them to guide NCO professional development decisions and to address weakness. Where is the vision these days, in the trash heap of time?

The NCO Strategy

Today the guiding principles of mission, vision goals for NCOs appears to be the NCO Strategy. “Enduring and flexible,” it is “nested in the guidance and vision of our leaders.” With multiple meanings, you could take the term strategy using military theory, or management theory. If you look at Wikipedia, their first order definition calls it “a general plan to achieve one or more long-term or overall goals under conditions of uncertainty” (Wikipedia). According to our current doctrine, the NCO Strategy reflects our Army values and NCO core competencies. And the concept  is to drive the NCO Guide, but will evolve to make sure the NCO Corps remains “current, relevant, and the best in the world.”

Reading between the lines, the long-range strategy for NCOs is only to last (enduring) as long as the current leadership is in place, but not one moment longer. It will change when the next leader comes in (flexible). Strategy is another symptom, and like authority and responsibility, are neither institutionally inculcated nor regulated for NCOs. By design, NCOs are supposed to ping around like a pinball with every change of command or change of responsibility. How can one master their profession when the rules keep changing? And don’t tell me, I don’t (or for the vets, didn’t) need all that drawn out for me. I am (or was) doing fine and I can figure it out. Well, if you think this is not a relevant and timely concern, you’re just kidding yourselves because the NCO Corps deserves better. I get it that many have mastered their roles through sheer talent alone, but that does not mean there is not an underlying problem that is not spoken about out loud. Meh, it is no big deal, right?

This topic ties back to the culture of the Army and how the senior NCOs at the operational and strategic levels are viewed in the shadows. In public we are considered the “backbone” of the institution, but behind closed doors and out of earshot different words are used to describe enlisted leaders. And you know why? It’s because the rest of the Army doesn’t understand that the roles and responsibility change with every leader. They are usually not privy to the instructions and directives commanders give to their NCO counterparts or how short or long their leash is going to be. And then it changes again. The Army’s purpose remains constant, but does the NCOs? I mean how could we be, the goalposts keep moving.

I don’t profess to have the answers, I am laying the ugly baby out for all to see. If you think it’s cute, that’s fine, move on. But if you have the capacity to think a bit deeper than your own experiences, or of those around you, you might be able to see how this affects opinions of senior NCOs, and how they are viewed as we weave left and right with every leader change. It is perceptions. Are there those among us who do not have a clear understanding of their left and right limits because of misunderstanding of which side of the road we are driving on today? And would having an enduring and detailed road map help alleviate some of the character issues that seem endemic within our ranks of late? I’ll leave that to the reader to decide, but for me? My view is that until Army leadership can tolerate “staying the course,” expect the unexpected. So smaj, keep those goal posts on wheels.

CSM (Ret.) Daniel K. Elder

/topsarge

I was browsing the Army University Press (AUP) listing of subject matter experts across the Army University and was wowed by the knowledge and capability we have that is just a phone call away. The many names of experts are soldiers and Department of the Army civilians entrenched in places like the Command and General Staff School, the School for Advanced Military Studies, the Army Management Staff College, and the Army University, among others.

AUP is a component of the Army University, and both are the result of consolidation and was a “capability grab” that centralized many PME and academic resources at the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. One of those capabilities was the NCO Journal, which unlike the branch journals, was redirected away from the institution it had supported since its founding, NCOLCoE and the Sergeants Major Academy. At one time it was a job of a lifetime for aspiring public affairs sergeants major to serve as the editor, our own journal by sergeants, for sergeants. Now it only exists in digits, far from its center of gravity, and without the same level of NCO involvement as before.

The SGM-A has been a branch campus of CGSC and a part of Army University when portions of the capstone school formerly known as the Sergeants Major Academy was also scooped up (for academics mostly). It shares its regional accreditation, or more accurate flows through, and allows the SGM-A students to matriculate from the course and be conferred  baccalaureate degrees upon SGM-A graduation. So, the consolidation was not all bad.

But as I searched what surely is not an all-inclusive list it is glaringly apparent that the AUP has yet to identify and declare one enlisted soldier or NCO as a subject matter expert as part of the greater institution we call Army University. I get most of the Army experts in the institutional assignments on the topics listed that they have all the right faces in all the right places, but who is the expert on NCO PME? What about the academic departments of the SGM-A, the directorates that create the policy or curriculum that underpin NCOPDS. Hell, even our NCO Historian Dr. Ev Daugue is excluded from this esteemed list of subject matter experts. Why?

The oversight can be fixed with the stroke of a pen, or a VOCO from the Beags, but that is not the point. Again, and consistently, and no matter how many Years of the NCO we have, the NCO corps gets short shrift in the eyes of the professionals. C’mon AUP and Army University, it is high time you increase enlisted leader involvement in all functions at CAC in places other than the top, until you do these oversights will continue. And this is just the symptom, not what ails us. Since before Ike’s time Fortress Leavenworth and all that happens at CAC remains officer centric, and often myopic to the NCO corps. It is too important of an institution to not have a healthy mix of enlisted leader perspectives, and in more important areas than vanity labels on a webpage. It may be high time to blow the dust off the restationing plan for NCOLCoE, and BRAC the starship Enterprise from El Paso to Leavenworth once and for all.

Daniel Elder

/Topsarge

Opinions are my own. Spelling, punctuation and typing errors are mine too and should be enjoyed as the easter eggs that they are.

Soldiers from across the 25th Infantry Division and U.S. Army Hawaii were testing their proficiency in basic infantry and Soldier tasks in 2021 in the hopes of earning the Expert Infantryman Badge or the Expert Soldier Badge. Photo by Spc. Jessica Scott (04.27.2021)

Sergeants do not make decisions, we advise. Beyond the squad leader, the general premise is that every enlisted leader above and below the squad leader, who is typically a staff sergeant (S. Sgt.) pay grade E-6, serves as a member of a support channel of communication and supervision. According to Army demographic data S. Sgts. make up about 16% of the total enlisted inventory population (Department of the Army, 2022), so what in the heck good are the other 120k of enlisted leaders?

Well, according to para. 2-19 in Army Command Policy AR 600-20, "Commanders will define the responsibilities and authority of their NCOs to their staff and subordinates," meanwhile they list 11 functions that NCOs will follow to “assist” the chain of command in accomplishing. The July 20, 2020 edition lists what I can only guess is an error in that NCOs should use DA Pam 611–21 (and the NCO Guide) to understand “responsibilities, command functions, and scope of NCO duties” when it should most likely be DA PAM 600-25, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide. But calling for change there is another artcile for another day.

As a citizen historian and cub reporter for almost 30 years I have been studying, reporting on, and sometimes even and scuffing up the U.S. Army NCO corps. I have accepted the fact the enlisted force is subservient to other cohorts because that is the way it has always been done, and we as NCOs just ought to stick to the basics. You know what they call it, “blocking and tackling.” My pals watch my ears turn red when I hear phrases about basic NCOs because they know I will probably repeat what one of my mentors, Sg. Maj. Felix Sanchez asked me one day after being told that phrase. We were working on creating the course material for the first-ever virtual senior and advanced level PME courses and getting pushback from the top that reminded him to stick to the basics. Returning to our cube farm he slammed down his hand and said, “I have been getting back to the basics my whole damn career, what I want to know is when the hell do we start getting to the advance stuff!” Sorry Chez, I think we are heading back to basic training again.

Okay, it’s not too hard to find the basic role of the NCO….we are trainers, mentors, advisors and communicators (Pam 600-25, 2023). Add those to the NCO support channel functions and you see the core foundation of what the heck we are good for. But is that it?!? You mean to tell me that the enlisted leader cohort does not have the capability or capacity to do more than “assist,” “advise,” or to have “shared responsibility?” I mean, has anybody even considered trying to place NCOs in critical decision-making positions and give them the authority and responsibility to operate? And I don’t necessarily mean commanding units, though that is a thought for later. I know why an enlisted commandant does not have court martial convening authority and manage their own UCMJ, it is according to the MCM. But it can change, cant it?

Follow the Money

Also, enlisted leaders don’t have teh power of the purse. We do not have the authority to buy stuff that we and our units need with Army money, either. We don’t manage budgets, we don’t acquire goods, we do not procure equipment or services, except at the Pcard level (and usually only a supply sergeant, with command approval). We don’t approve policy, even if it affects only our cohort and nothing else, it still must be signed off. Every action in every unit requires a commander’s signature, and NCOs dont command squat. It’s the way we do things, it’s the basic fundamentals of how we operate the Army. So, it has been written, and so it will be done. So why do we put up with it that way? Here is what my friend Mark Baker thought about how NCOs expectations are managed.

Hat tip to the creator of Pvt. Murphy’s Law Mark Baker ©1993-1999. Mark was using 1998 pay scale. Today an O-2 with 3 years makes more money than an SFC with 20-years.

The NCO Support Channel blues

The first attempt to codify a channel for NCOs distinct and separate from staff and technical channels began with Change 8 of AR 600-20 in April 1978. The Army went more than 200 years before the roles and responsibilities were described in that way at the department level, and the nine functions listed were mostly similar to what we have now. To me, those are the “basics” considering the capabilities and capacity of today’s noncommissioned officer. In almost 50-years the NCO support channel has not been tinkered with much and I find my mind going back to Chez’s question about when do we as NCOs get to the advance stuff?

At the basic level, we have NCO tank and Bradley commanders, enlisted skippers on Army watercraft, and NCOs piloting and controlling unmanned systems. Enlisted commandants lead our NCO academies, the Drill Sergeant School and we even see company commanders at the NCO Leader Center of Excellence and the Sergeants Major Academy. But each one has had their duties and responsibilities defined by their current existing officer leadership, which is a limitation and restriction that is only applied to the enlisted cohort. The military operates under civilian authority and even Department of Army civilians have authority over and ahead of most enlisted leaders, especially when compared to grade standards table.

From my very first level of ePME I learned about the five sources of power. Though the noncommissioned officer can learn to master the other four (or the least three positive ones), the one that matters most is legitimate power. The annals of Army history are replete with stories of our commissioned officer cohort who have created and ran our Army with nary an NCO be attributed. For hundreds of years the “good NCOs” were commissioned. Meanwhile, our roles have continued to be limited to the basic fundamental tasks because the institution itself has not expanded them. It is easy to look over the fence and covet thy neighbors property, but test my theory by checking Futures Command, Materiel Command, or the Acquisition communities and count the officer to enlisted personnel ratio, especially at the mid level.

We might have a senior NCOs at the top of the pyramid in some of those places, and then (echo) (echo), there is a huge gap in enlisted participation. It’s because we are needed elsewhere performing our "basic" duties…it is what our roles have been defined as. Also, note the different “functional areas” that are available to the officer cohort and see how many either exclude NCOs totally, or we are ratioed instead. Consider population-wise that enlisted ;eaders are the largest cohort in comparison at every grade, ratio-wise, and our benefits and opportunities are way out of proportion. Maybe that is because we are not the decision-makers who draw the personnel authorization charts, or are even a part of the dialog? The problems don't lie in the authorization or assignment, but goes back to the fundamental role of NCOs to understand why we are excluded. Read the book Upstream: : The Quest to Solve Problems Before They Happen (affiliate link) by Dan Heath not only to see how to get to the root of NCO restrictions and limitations, but why modifying it its going to require a culture change.

The next battle ground for equality

In the last 20 years I have seen an increase in better broadening assignments, and more developmental opportunities are now available to NCOs. We now have a Fellows program that allows a small token of the most senior enlisted leaders annually to earn their master’s degree on the Army dime, on Army time. But compare that to the Army Congressional Fellowship Program to which the NCO Fellowship is not even connected. Ratioed again. The pockets of programs, assignments, and duties that are available to every cohort other than enlisted  are staggering. Even the Enlisted Aide program is wonky. Check out a Maj. or Lt. Col. serving as an aid to a general officer and watch their duties, as compared to the enlisted aid to that same general officer. You mean we couldn’t replace that major with a master sergeant and allow that same access and mentorship the GO provides the major to the M. Sgt.? Or how about we replace that major who is serving ASA(ALT) as an alternate deputy program manager for some future widget system 2025 with a senior NCO? Who knows, maybe we will get the kind of gear soldiers want and need? NO WAY, get back to the line, sargn’t.

I’m not all gloom and doom, I have hope. Hope because in the last 20-years I have seen so many firsts that my head is spinning as old policies and ways of doing business are being crushed. But one area we are not investigating is the division between the ranks. Gender, race, religion, sexual orientation and so many other social divisions have been on the table for the defense department, but the one social division not being spoken about is the class divide. The word sergeant traces its lineage from Latin as serviens or “serving.” No longer does the medieval customs of serjeanty for which nobles and knights had their trusted servien (servant) apply to the role to the modern enlisted leader, yet this class distinction remains.

Blurred Lines

Today, the point at which lines blur between officer and enlisted cohorts is at the senior NCO ranks where the only discriminator between the two is, or was, education. Promotion competition requires NCOs to chase degrees, and generous ePME opportunities push enlisted KSBs more closer to toward their officer counterparts. And, I hear too much about source of degree for NCOs (who pair school with their day jobs). I have seen a majors from some ROTC grads who only had to focus on schooling (and extracurriculars, if you know what I mean), so lay off. Inventory time. Lets measure all the post MLC E-8’s with ~14 years in the Army to all the post C³ O-3s with ~6 years and see if they are equally qualified to take command at the company level? Forget BCAP, maybe we only need to settled this in the pit.

Just last week I saw some hurrahing in what some believed to be our first enlisted leader on a major political ticket, but that is not so. Commissary Sergeant (and later Bvt Maj.) and twice elected President William McKinley was the first. Meanwhile, glass ceilings are getting broken every day. Just this week Lt. Gen. Kevin Admiral became the 63rd commander, and first African American, of the III Corps and Ft. Cavazos. Women and minority leaders are reaching new hieights, congrats. Meanwhile, NCOs are surrounded by glass, left right, up and down. The Army owes itself a relook of what the future holds for the noncommissioned officer in the changing dynamics of future operational envoironment. In the 1970s and before the big four system were fielded it was believed that because of the complexity of the XM1 tank that each system was going to have to be commanded by a lieutenant because NCOs were not capable enough. We are not that far away from that mindset.

The legacy of Sgt. Bilko, Sgt. Schultz, and Sgt. Maj. Plumly are in the past, today’s enlisted cohort is smarter and savvier than ever. To get upstream, we must fix what’s downstream first, and that is the heart of NCO power and authority. And not only to make change to make change, but to ensure equitable access to professional development and broadening opportunities, while ensuring that they are applied equally at ratios commensurate with populations across the Army as a whole.

It’s time to blow the dust off of the NCO Support Channel rulebook and conduct an independent analysis to determine future roles, responsibilities and functions at each level of the enlisted cohort. Today, the NCO Strategy is nested in the guidance and vision of Army leaders, which is the only way the NCO Support Channel is allowed to operate. It’s because of that changing and ambiguous guidance that the NCO Corps can never quite master its position. No other group in the Army has to operate like this. As soon as NCOs get good at current guidance and it is within our grip, a change of command or change of responsibility causes it all to slip away and we have to start again. And now, we are back to the basics.

Saddle up everybody, coach says we need to get out there and practice our blocking and tackling.

Dan Elder

/topsarge

Command Sgt. Maj. Kepner assumes duties as 11th sergeant major of the Army Guard. By Sgt. 1st Class Jon Soucy National Guard Bureau, Guard News, The National Guard. June 10, 2016

In 1958, after years of rank compression, most prominently in the enlisted cohorts, the Department of Defense expanded the pay tables and added two enlisted ranks at grade E-8 and E-9. While enlisted soldiers rejoiced the news early decisions were to assign those grades to positions to tables of organization that were viewed as the “tough jobs,” the first sergeant and the regimental sergeants major of a color bearing unit. Many senior enlisted soldiers in those jobs at the time were the grizzled veterans of World War II and Korea, and soon those leaders who were already serving in those positions on the line began to get promoted to these new ranks, earning the benefit of higher pay for their service.

Previously, the top three graders were the center of gravity for the enlisted cohort of the time, with an E-7 either being a platoon sergeant or a first (or master) sergeant, depending on their duty position. Each regiment also had the duty position of sergeant major, which eventually became the rank title for the pay grade E-9. When the grade changes came about there were others in the E-7 pay grade who had shied away from tough jobs who were serving on staffs, in nontraditional field roles, or buried in an office of general officer led command, who now wanted a chance at getting promoted without putting in the time.

Bloated Ranks

The enlisted ranks were also filled with RIF’d officers and battlefield commissioned mustangs who reverted back to enlisted statsus, often riding out their time to retire at the highest grade. Besides compression, their was bloat, and the enlisted cohort was a dumping grounds for types of compassioned reasons. The promotion system was decentralized and managed by the unit; so, one couldn’t get promoted unless there was a vacant position. By all accounts, the “stripes” were owned and managed by the unit, which caused enlisted soldiers to have to jockey for assignments to allow them upward mobility and promotion. And for the good ol’ boy system to hook a brother up.

What arose was a proliferation of E-8 and E-9 positions, and over time some ended up serving in E-9 sergeant major positions mostly doing administrative tasks at general-officer and flag level (what we call nominative positions today). Many at the time were believed to be living on easy street, while their counterparts we serving as sergeants major in regiments, then later battalions and brigades, slogging it out on the line. After complaints rose to the top, Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson directed sergeant major William O. Wooldridge, who had only two years earlier been selected as the first ever sergeant major of the Army, to form a group to study the problem. The result of that was that the Army created a new rank and position of Command Sergeant Major to better identify the sergeant major of a command.

Wooldridge would later say they did not conduct any serious study of the problem, and he never experienced that confusion himself firsthand. He said, when he was a unit sergeant major in the field, everyone knew who he was, and they knew who the S-3 sergeant major was. During their short study he and his ad hoc committee’s belief was CSMs should only be at the battalion and brigade, and not at the division or higher. However, it was positions at the division, corps and beyond was where the misidentification troubles laid, the original gripe came from the U.S. Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM). And so, after their recommendations went to the Chief, the action was handed off to the Army G-1 for implementation, and Wooldridge would go on to say “they did it all wrong.” OPO had conducted a study a year earlier in 1967 “to improve the caliber and effectiveness of sergeants major coccupying traditional command sergeants major positions.” They estblished a CSM Program and the new rank proliferated. The senior NCO of every flag bearing unit, which in 1968 was estimated to be between 1500 positions, were coded as CSM and 192 of those men (and one woman) who served in the top tier flag positions were the first appointed as command sergeants major.

Long Live the Sergeant Major

Using Wooldridge as a judge of a program is risky as he had dark secrets which would later be uncovered, but some 35-years later he still believed the NCO corps lost control of the program because “it immediately went to personnel” (Office of Personnel Management at the Pentagon), and that we had “done it to ourselves by not standing firm and being counted when the program was announced.” And now for over 50-years some in the Army have a love-hate relationship with the position of command sergeant major, most especially above the battalion or brigade level. So much so, in my opinion we have created this vision of the CSM as an enigma, resulting in people coming down with something I call CSM derangement syndrome. With that said, after years of study and research, I feel for too many unspoken reasons and for NCOs not standing up for ourselves still, we need to get back to the original root of the problem and fix what Wooldridge’s small committee could not do. And to do that we must kill the rank and title of Command Sergeant Major and return to the rightful title of address and position of the most senior enlisted leader of the battalion and brigade the original rank of sergeant major, and for it not to be used for positions above the O-6 level.

The Army has a need for enlisted leaders in key roles above the brigade, whether advising commanders or serving in a technical role on a staff. However roles, responsibility, and authority of each of them specifically is where the OPO punted in 1968. The Army did not define a clear role for the CSM, and for many that remains a mystery that is akin to conspiracy. Some get hung up on the changing role of the CSM, while others confuse the words command and authority when it comes to the CSM duites and roles, especially when it comes down to enforcement. To tell the truth, it was probably the best option that could have been done to provide upward mobility to the enlisted ranks, and to offer prestige. But in today’s environment the Army can reap a return on the significant investment in professional education for the enlisted cohort. The sergeant major of today is much different than when the CSM program was first envisioned. Wooldridge would say about the enlisted leaders of his era, “We promoted people who weren't qualified to fill the position that was so-called command slot.” In my view today we have a more stringent selection process as compared to the original, and we can endure an overhaul.

I don’t suggest we tear apart our rank structure just for the sake of some people getting butthurt about a word, but we have real problems that we continue to suck up. There are other dirty secrets when it comes to senior enlisted stature because we still are not standing up for ourselves as a profession. The role and authority of the sergeant major of the command is not well defined, and changes at the will of the commander. The most highly trained and educated enlisted members of the U.S. Army are on a leash that is only defined by their current commander, which grows and shrinks at any time. Though there is a defined NCO support channel with mumbo jumbo chain language, the fact remains senior enlisted leaders have no real authority, are not in command, and do not make policy, even when it affects them most.

Today a CSM serving at the command, or nominative, level notionally progressed from battalion to brigade, and to the division or command, all without monetary gain. While the officer cohort that moves through those positions progress to higher pay grades and monetary increases that are long lasting into retirement, instead the E-9s are awarded “hush money” by way of pro pay per “star” level of their boss. As the CSM  progresses their short-term pay is higher, but compare the retirement pay of a Corps Commander and the Corps Command Sergeant Major. Not that they should be equal, but the Corps CSM pay is the same as that of a purely technical staff sergeant major with equal years of service, but often with less time on the line, and without the responsibility and culpability.

Warranted Sergeants Major

The way we should advance enlisted leaders beyond brigade is to warrant them, just as the Army does with a warrant officer one (WO1). Service secretaries have the authority to warrant technical experts, which the command sergeant of today is. At the top of their branch, we need Warranted Sergeants Major (WSM) to serve at command level, and provide them roles, responsibility, and legal authority to perform advanced duties commensurate with Army requirements. And allow them the authority to create policy and allocate resources. The way they could be assessed into such a program is that once a Brigade-level sergeant major is selected to serve at division (or equivalent) and higher they receive a warrant and transition from the enlisted pay table to the warrant and begin at WO3 level. Chief warrant officers are warranted in the name of the President; however, I suggest the WSM remain with the service secretary throughout.

The sergeant major rank and wreath can remain to serve as the identifier for a warranted sergeant major, and the pay is not only commensurate with their duties and responsibility, but it will finally carry over to retirement. The band for the first level of WO3 is for 1- and 2-star level WSMs. Should one be selected for the next band, 3-or-4-star level, they are increased to pay WO4. And if they are skilled enough to be selected as the Sergeant Major of the Army, SEAC, SEL of the Guard, or a host of other current or future service level positions, they would retain their current rank insignia and titles, but be advanced to the pay band of WO5. All of this can be done at the service level and does not require changes to DoD pay tables.

According to the Department of Defense, “Warrant officers hold warrants from their service secretary and are specialists and experts in certain military technologies or capabilities.” This can define the WSM, and not only expand the pay, but the prestige of the senior enlisted cohort. It also allows Army leaders to more clearly define roles, responsibility, and bestow authority on senior enlisted leaders. But what about the E-9 specialists, how are they to be addressed and identified? I suggest a  return to the original rank insignia decisions after the 1958 military pay bill was enacted, it is time to reintroduce the Specialist 9 rank insignia and retitle the position as staff sergeant major. This term was one of the original titles of address for the E-9 enlisted member on a staff who was not the senior NCO of a color bearing unit, and should have stuck instead of creating a whole new rank and title.

Staff Sergeant Major (Specialist 9)

The Specialist 8 and 9 ranks were created, but never used as the opinion was that NCOs above E-7 have a leadership role and must wear sergeants’ stripes. Today the staff sergeant major may supervise a small team of fellow staff NCOs, the fact of the matter is they are mostly technicians who work in a specialty position indirectly related to leadership, and more of one as a manager. The Army uses the term management 44 times in ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession, but manager only oncee. We need to get over ourselves and realize that not every enlisted member is a leader, and that the Army needs managers too. Look, staff sergeants major along with their primary staff officer, manage resources, equipment, time, and other functions that we typically associate with DOTMLPF. These are the NCOs in the G-staff’s, serving technical roles in ceneters of excellence, and in senior command levels providing administrative advice and effort. These positions differ from those of the senior NCO of the command, the WSM, and as such should wear the rank that designates they are technician and administrators, which is what the Specialist 9 rank was designed for.

The Continental Army that earned our independence was modeled after European armies and the regimental sergeant major is a title of address with a long history and was even used as a position in the U.S. Army until the regimental system was broken up to our current task organization of company-battalion-brigade-division. Those same western Armies also warrant their senior enlisted leaders. Warrant Officer Class 1 (WO1) Paul Carney is the Army Sergeant Major (ASM) and the highest-ranking NCO in the British Army. Kim Felmingham is the 12th Regimental Sergeant Major of the Australian Army (RSM-A) is the most senior warrant officer in the Australian Army and a member of the Chief of Army's personal staff. There are other, and this is not a ludicrous idea here.

Command sergeants major were appointed, not anointed; the rank and title are misleading. I advocate for change, and one that solves a number of burning issues that all senior enlisted leaders know are true. But instead, we suck it and try to make the rank insignia, roles, and titles work. Some define insanity as doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Let’s deal with the problems of sergeants major of a command and the technical sergeants major that exist, create a new pathway in order to give senior enlisted leaders authority and responsibility that has been missing since the 1968 implementation decisions. That, and provide a lasting pay incentive for serving the tough jobs and at levels of responsibility commensurate with their expertise. The NCO Corps replaced the Top Three Graders in 1958 yet we still haven’t earned our place as a true profession. These actions could be another step toward that ultimate goal.

CSM (Ret) Daniel K. Elder

/topsarge

U.S. Soldiers, assigned to the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment prepare weapons for training during a simulated training exercise at Vilseck, Germany Feb. 5, 2024. The exercise engages in platoon-level training within field and urban... (U.S. Army photo by Spc. William Kuang)

Have you ever been in a leadership or key staff position where you faced a problem or challenge that required a group effort to achieve the best outcome? According to Dr. Bill Howatt in an article published in Forbes Magazine, “Collaborative leadership goes beyond a leader’s team. It includes discovering the best way to join forces with other leaders to ensure no silos between groups impede opportunities to achieve the organization’s full potential.” (Howatt, 2023)

In my current role as a Topsarge Business Solutions research assistant with a role to collaborate with U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Centers of Excellence, I have experienced first-hand about the need to join forces with others without being in charge or the leader. At one site that I support, the top leader’s vision focused on collaboration across the organization to effect positive change and identify innovative solutions to challenges facing her cohort of senior enlisted leaders. To put that vision into motion one step included the formation of a new partnership that brought together our leader development and research firm, military research specialists and psychologists, and the institution’s forward-thinking office in order to investigate and develop new initiatives.

This style is early in its lifecycle, but after tackling a few complex problem sets the arrangement has allowed the ad hoc team to find collaboration methods and operate harmoniously as a peer group. So far, the team has succeeded in finding potential solutions that were created by bringing together a variety of talents and skills that did not exist on location before. This method of co-creation aligned specialists and subject matter experts who provided feedback to the overall group for progress and allowing each collaboration partner to retain their own identities.

Since December of 2023, the team has successfully collaborated on three projects, yielding positive results. The impact of these efforts has the potential to develop into enduring relationships which can positively affect the studied cohort. This was made possible through discussions and fostering of relationships between forward thinking leaders and various staff elements, moving toward a common goal: streamlining of systems and processes, thinking outside the box, and most importantly creating an environment where multiple thoughts, experiences, and views are respected and encouraged to develop a better product.

Matt

Command Sergeant Major Matthew T. Lord, U.S. Army, Retired

(26/04/1997) Major General James T. Hill, Deputy CHIEF of STAFF of the United States Army Forces Command, and Roving Sands '97 Exercise Commander Forward, speaks on the accomplishments of the troops involved in ROVING SANDS 97 during an interview with the 1ST Combat Camera Squadron. -A1C Benjamin M. Andera, USAF

I have held on to this typed speech from General James T. Hill for who knows how long. Unfortunately I did not cite my find, unaware of still today on how I came across what appears to be an orginal copy, likely collected from an archive or another dusty folder in my hunt for real-world examples of leadership in action. I typically write about enlisted leaders and noncommissioned officers, but today on this particular birthday of America I wanted to share words of experience and wisdom for those in uniform who might be asking themselves “what’s it all worth.”

I never served directly with Gen. Hill, but we served in the same Army during the last 20-years of his career. According to History.net he “retired in 2004 after serving as commander of the U.S. Southern Command from 2002 to 2004. He is credited as being one of the architects of rebuilding the Army in the wake of Vietnam. In February 1991, General Hill served as brigade commander in the 101st Airborne Division, when he played a key role in Operation Desert Storm and winning the Gulf War.” Seeming to me as a speech to a group of familes of the 25th Infantry Division, which he commanded from June 1995 to June 1997, making this topic something apparantly top of mind to him almost 30 years ago.

These are his words, and for many long forgotten, but hopefully his spirit of hope and pride rings true still today. Happy Birthday America.

/topsarge

Graduating from high school in 1964 -fully one year before the first major battle of the Vietnam War, the first battle for the Ia Drang Valley, described in LTG Hal Moore and Joe Galloway ' s brilliant book, We Were Soldiers Once and Young -I had appointments to the Naval and Air Force Academies, but at the last minute decided that I didn't want anything to do with military life. So off I went to Trinity University in San Antonio, sight unseen, where much to my surprise there was mandatory Army ROTC.

Vietnam looming on the horizon, I stayed in after two years, went to ROTC summer camp, and found I kind of liked the camaraderie, the challenge . I chose Infantry on commissioning in 1968, thinking that I liked what I thought was the Army and might even make it a career, but if I was going off to war, I might as well find out what real war was about and go as an infantryman. And, I confess, I was 21, and like many youths, a naive idealist, a romantic . I believed there was glory in war, a chance to test my courage. I know now that there is no glory in war, in its suffering and agony and tragedy, but there can be honor in war, Honor found in the soldier's creed of selfless service, service to a people and a group of soldiers and a country and an army and an imperfect process called democracy. I joined and served a draftee army in Vietnam -a very good army. I was a rifle platoon leader, a recon platoon leader, and a company commander in combat honored to lead American soldiers in combat.

To this very day I hold that service, command of an infantry rifle company in combat, as my greatest privilege -my Combat Infantryman's Badge, my highest award . I served in a disciplined force, saw nothing of the horror stories of indiscipline shown in movies like "Platoon". I did not serve in Oliver Stone's Vietnam . I remember young men of courage, good humored, and goodnatured, under some terrible and frightening conditions, longing to return to the "world" as we called it. And we all did r e turn, some on freedom birds to an uncaring, unsympathetic society, and some in body bags, to grieving families, alone in their sorrow because we didn't go as units, and therefore family support groups -God bless family support groups -weren't there to help. Another word on family support groups. I'm going to read a segment from the epilogue of We Were Soldiers Once and Young. The words are Betty Mapson's whose father died in the Ia Drang Valley. If after hearing it you still don't understand the absolute necessity for family support groups and pledge yourself to be more helpful to families -that is the calling I spoke of earlier -then I say you just don't get it and probably won't. So, at the end of your tour of duty, go on back home, let someone more caring take your place. We lead and serve people, not personnel.

QUOTE

After the initial shock of receiving the telegram announcing daddy's death, we kids had to go back to school because it would be two weeks or more before his body would arrive home. It seemed everyone was looking at us and whispering, not really knowing what to say except how bad it was our daddy died over there. They mostly left us alone. There were no support groups or any of that to help us cope. Our family was left alone in our grief. My brothers did not talk about their feelings at all. My mother was devastated. She and daddy were sweethearts in school but each went on to marry other people. When both were divorced around the same time they met again and were married. Daddy and I used to take trips together on the greyhound bus, mostly home to Savannah. Whenever he and my mother went out, he would not be ready until he sat in a chair and had me comb and brush his hair. It was cut real close but he made it seem like I had really done something special.

I remember when he first told us he had to go to Vietnam. We drove him to Fort Benning. I remember the army trucks filled with soldiers and hearing daddy say he might not come back. I was young and didn't really see the seriousness of it. He was a good, strict father and my brothers and I thought his being away for so long meant we would be able to stay out later and have more fun. I blamed myself for daddy being killed because of those selfish feelings when he left. My daddy was a good man, a preacher's son. His given name is Jeremiah.

Two weeks after the initial telegram, we got another one stating when to meet the body at the train station . The hearse was already there when we got to the station and soon a wooden cart with a long gray box was being pulled toward us. My daddy! This is how he came back to us. And the pain started all over again for us, only more so because now he was home. You could have heard me screaming three states away. At the funeral home remember looking at him closely and for a long time to make sure it was really him . Then I saw that little mole on his cheek --and I knew.

I am so proud of my father and wished that somehow he could know that and know that he is still very much alive with us. For a long time it seemed to me that he was just away like he usually was on Army duty, and one day he would come home. For a lot of years I waited and watched our driveway because I wanted so much for him to come home for my momma and my brothers and me. I would like to visit the Ia Drang. It is something I have to do for my own sake. I have to know, have to see that this place really exists. I need to see and to be where my daddy died. Then maybe this will all somehow be complete for me. I just wish with all my heart that we had not been so alone to deal with such a monumental tragedy back then. We needed someone to reach out to us, to explain for us, to help us see why. My mother has passed away now. She never remarried. She loved daddy so.

UNQUOTE

There is a plaque on the right wall, just as you enter the Tropic Lightning Soldier's Chapel. It is dedicated to the dead of Vietnam, but I believe also dedicated to the survivors. It reads, "not for fame or reward, not goaded by ambition or lured by necessity, but in simple obedience to discipline as they understood it, these men dared all, suffered, and died .

"You ask why I serve -why, indeed! I found out something about myself in the jungles of Vietnam. I loved the Infantry and the Army ... and I was pretty good at it. I stayed, applied for and received a regular army commission. But, the army that emerged from the jungles of Vietnam was a shell of its former self, the old NCO corps -the sergeants of World War II and Korea that led the Army into Vietnam -had either retired or been killed. The American people, through their congress, decided we needed a volunteer army, not an army of conscripts, and ended the draft.

We entered into a new age -and the birth pains were agonizing. It was the 70s, the period I call the "Awful Army" .. . where in the 25th Infantry Division of the mid-seventies you could not go to the field without losing one or two weapons . .. when, as a company commander, if you only had 5-6 AWOLs a week in your company, you were a great leader and people asked you how you did it .. . where sergeants feared to go into the barracks when they were charge of quarters, and staff duty officers wore side arms. And I do not exaggerate to make a point. It was that way, and not only in Hawaii, but throughout the Army. There were three involuntary officer reductions-in-force in the seventies: the first got bums, the second and third took good officers, and other good officers were bailing out right and left. As a young captain, I signed my resignation papers twice, but just could not go through with it. I told my wife, Toni, that I simply could not walk away and leave it -my Army, my soldiers -in the hands of others. Who will lead, I asked her?

Who will lead? Why I serve? Why, indeed. Well, we survived the 70s and began to thrive in the 80s. We hit rock bottom as an army, and maybe as a nation, in the desert of Iran as we failed ignominiously trying to rescue our 53 hostages in the embassy in Tehran. We weren't trained, and we weren't ready, and as a result, we failed the Nation. It's so vivid to me, the sixties and the seventies, just like it all happened yesterday, yet I know that it is alien to all of you here -and throughout the 25th Infantry Division, that is true.

Neither of my assistant division commanders served in Vietnam, and of all my brigade level, 0-6 commanders and staff, only the Chief of Staff, served in Vietnam. Very few of our CSMs served in Vietnam, only two leap to mind. And while the colonels know the 70s, even most of my battalion commanders, entered the Army in 1980 and afterwards. So, how did we survive the 70s to thrive in the 80s? I believe it's because we shared a common set of values: honor, duty, courage, loyalty, integrity, respect, and selfless service . Even in the darkest hour, when it appeared that the inmates were running the asylum, the leadership, steeled in the jungles of Vietnam, didn't quit on the American dream, though for a time we thought the American ideal had quit on us. We stayed the course, believed in ourselves and in our values -duty,

honor courage, loyalty, integrity, respect, and most importantly, selfless service -and we did not lower ourselves to the lesser standard. We were guided by the visionaries of the day -Chiefs of Staff of the Army like General Shy Meyer who had the guts to call it "hollow" like it was then, but not today, and General John Wickham who almost single handedly reminded us that we had to respect each other, to be our brother's and sister's keeper, to make a difference in the lives of soldiers and their families, and thereby readiness. They gave us the tools to reclaim the Army; urinalysis, higher recruiting standards -high school graduates became the norm not the exception -the CTCs, a new training management system and ethos, and "Be all you can be." None of you will remember the original recruiting slogan of the volunteer army -"the U.S. Army wants to join you" -join you? No way I want to join you; I want you to join us -be all you can be, a challenge to leader and led alike.

So, for the most part, it was my generation who rebuilt the "Awful Army," rebuilt it with discipline and hard work and Ronald Reagan dollars and vision, rebuilt it into a trained and ready force, the best army the world has ever seen, took it to the desert and proved it to be so. It wasn't easy -it took sacrifice and courage and hard work by some of the very best men and women in this nation -but it was worth it. Today, the American people respect, not revile you; you are a revered group of professionals -as it should be and will be, or I'm out of here. I will not go back. You ask why I serve? Why, indeed.

We have endured as an army of professionals because we were, are, and will remain a values-based army, an army made up of folks who live and understand the values of honor, duty, courage, loyalty, integrity, respect -and, mostly, selfless service. We all come at selfless service from different perspectives, but we all come to it knowing that we serve a greater good, a greater cause and we do it as I said earlier, not for fame or reward, not goaded by ambition or lured by necessity. And, so it must always be.

We won the cold war, yet there is no peace. There are still forces, evil forces, at work in the world today that would take away our freedom, destroy our way of living. We must, you and I, continue to stand in the breach, to serve, to protect and defend our country and our people. And it requires the best men and women among us, men and women dedicated to selfless service, bolstered by duty, honor, courage, loyalty, integrity, and respect. Those values got us through the 70s, and they will guide us as we continue to be a trained and ready Army, as we overcome the troubles of today just as we did in the past. Why I serve? Why, indeed.

I am reminded at gatherings with young professionals like you, like this. I am reminded every day. I am reminded every time I run with soldiers and hear their cadence and the sound of their feet striking the pavement. I am reminded every time I hear of a family support group picking up the pieces after tragedy strikes in a unit. I'm reminded every time I see Army family volunteers giving freely of themselves for the greater good of the community. I'm reminded every time I hear Reveille, To the Colors, and Retreat, and especially Taps at night. I am reminded every time I look into the face of my son who is the future of this magnificent country. And, yes, I'm reminded by the faces and voices of the past, who call out to me at odd times -faces and voices with names unfortunately long forgotten, I'm embarrassed to confess; soldiers who asked for little except to be well led, treated with dignity and respect -and honored.

It seems to me that sometimes I can feel and touch their spirits as if they were still here, soldiers forever young . For as the poem goes, "they shall not grow old as you and I are left to grow old, age shall not weary them nor the years condemn." I deeply believe that you and I, the very best men and women our nation can produce, serve in a noble, honorable profession -the profession of arms . And, I don't know about you but, as for me, when this life ends, as it certainly will, I will be content if my tombstone reads: "He served . He was there." You ask why I serve? Why, indeed.

God bless you. God bless our great Army and Nation.

-Gen. James T. Hill

Soldiers from across the 25th Infantry Division and U.S. Army Hawaii test their proficiency in basic infantry and Soldier tasks in the hopes of earning the Expert Infantryman Badge or the Expert Soldier Badge in April, 2021. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Jessica Scott)

In 1982 I was stationed with 2nd Bn 30th Inf in Schweinfurt, GA when late in the year it was our unit’s turn to take the relatively new MOS proficiency test. It was a written exam for our maintenance MOS personnel’s turn to be evaluated on our knowledge of performing what were considered critical tasks for our MOS. The Marne Division at the time was being fielded the “Big 3” combat systems, the Apache, the Abrams, and the Bradley, we were at the front of the line for Army fielding. Already, the tankers at Conn Barracks had been issued their M1s and "Fonzi" was all over the front pages showing him in the TC hatch of a tank while the driver was tearing up the TA during a PAO event. The mechanized infantry battalions were eagerly awaiting our Bradley's, and my recent AIT graduate-buddies and I were among some of first Bradley mechanics in the division, if not the Army. Our unit had been drawing all the latest gear in a pre-rapid fielding initiative world in a theater who was just coming off extreme underfunding, and so the spigot was just being turned on to the 3ID for resources. So here were a bunch of us trying out a test for new MOS.

Created in 1977, the Skill Qualification Test (SQT) was a test on your grasp and memory of critical tasks in a given MOS or career field. One of the problems for many branches and MOSes was that the TTPs, doctrine, or equipment they were testing us on was outdated. Our mechanical MOS was so new that there really was not an exam, and instead we were evaluated on the previous non-Bradley MOSes in the mainstream Army units, which were MOS 63C and 63F, which most of my peers had formerly been involuntarily reclassified from. So, we were evaluated on the M48 tank, the GOER, the gasoline powered 5-ton cargo trucks, and more outdated equipment, or at least none that I was ever trained on, or that was in use in the battalion. But at least I had seen a gamma goat before I had to describe how to adjust the brakes on it. The scores across the battalion on MOS testing were quite abysmal, or so went the scuttlebutt. I didn't hear about SQT again until I got to the 24th Division, then at Fort Stewart, who had recently been designated as the Army test division as they readied to be next up for Big 3 fielding.

For me and soldiers in my career field, MOS testing was always a flop, and one that seemed unorganized, not useful, and measured the wrong skills. And unfortunately for the Army, it took a lot of resources to develop each test, proctor, administer, score, and return the results, all for which really had no effect on my career. That is not to say it was that way for everyone, as for a few years it was a factor in evals and promotions. But it seemed for so long it, and it and its replacement, were under review, were in trials, or “wouldn’t count” this year or the next. If you think back to how the ACFT was rolled out, you could see some similar the parallels.

From my time in 3rd ID up to at least 2007 I was somewhat always involved in unit testing of indidual skills and competencies, either common task testing (CTT), SQT, or the last dying gasp, skills development testing. I was either the one taking those tests, a tester, or a part of the unit NCO support channel planning and executing testing. And then later after they had mostly faded away as operations tempo increased, I was selected as a part of a select group of senior Army NCOs assisting the research community in studying the concept of reinstating testing. And let me tell you that my point of view from then to now has not softened. And that is, the Army was not able to pull it off testing then, and on its own, probably couldn’t do it now. I am not one to throw cold water on conversations on bringing back MOS testing, but as one who has lived it and studied the concept from all angles. I say before we rush to failure that it’s important to first look back at the past to see why it failed, removed those barriers, and then factor in modern challenges before a serious attempt is made. And most importantly, decide why you need it, and when! And the once you get it right, tie it to advancement. But first, are there other options?

Well, if there remains no MOS testing, how else could we objectively score technical competence in our NCOs? Well, I suggest we should not be considering that an issue after we already selected and promoted a soldier to the next grade! To me, it makes more sense that an NCO demonstrate competency at the next grade BEFORE we promote them. It’s time to scrap promotions based on “potential” and shift to promotion upon demonstrated competency. Yeah, that concept will throw our NCO development systems on their ear, but today the Army is in a holding pattern for a relook on structured NCO development continuum anyway, this is the perfect time to consider innovative ideas. During this pause, lets relook potential based promotions and instead investigate promotion on skill mastery instead. And we can using testing to demand mastery at each grade before we possibly advance people to quickly, or if they are not ready.

Our promotion system and methodology appears backwards, and it may be time to slow down promotions to allow NCOs to grasp certain tasks before they upgrade. Instead of selecting, training, educating and promoting I suggest we need to consider first training in operational assignments and then we annually test soldiers for MOS proficiency, externally. When an established level of proficiency is attained then promote, and send for basic, and later advanced, professnal military education. Sprinkle in certifications and higher education that matches their career field andno need to add a cutesy label, just call it THE NCO development program. Besides simply reordering the recipe, but this time we add in the missing ingredient. In this case to overcome earlier problems we add-in external exams and testing.

A problem I have seen with testing in the unit is the Army itself, meaning TRADOC in this case, could never keep up with the field. The institutional side of the Army is almost always underfunded and getting the left-over chicken…TRADOC seems to get the remaining dregs for DOTMPF. The best people, the newest equipment, the most money, the best buildings all go to the warfighters. How can MOS proponents write tests on gear, TTPs and standardized procedures if they have not seen, used or have access to?

And do not forget, the NCO and pre-NCO cohort, E4 to E-8, who probably most need this type of system, is pushing on 50 percent of enlisted strength. And this is across almost every MOS that is always in constant transformation. The scale and size of managing technical related competency exams is an undertaking not fully understood by many, considering what that would entail. By design, outside of say West Point or the civilian cohort, TRADOC doesn't have professional educators but instead operates on TDA assigned borrowed military manpower. Back in my day, the problems were that amateurs were creating the tests.

To get to a new mindset and achieve a more robust plan we must first reframe it not as an in service exam like the old SQT or SDT, but as a gateway to the next grade, and test before you get in position, not after. So first we must fix the promotion system. But after that, it's about facing reality that no matter how much we wish for TRADOC to do this task for the Army, it is time to hand off this important work to professionals.

I suggest that Army award a “no compete” contract direct award to the American Center for Educational Testing (ACET), the same agency who delivers the SAT and GRE, to develop and administer promotion exams in collaboration with MOS and branch proponents. Or the Educational Testing Service, the same ones who seem to manage CLEP without letting the test answer key get out. And whoa boy, those old MOS SQT answer keys were rumored to be for sale or obtainable back in the day. Today's dynamic exam tools that professionals like ACET and ETS protect their tests, their processes, and their reputation like their business model depends on it. Because it does.

And, once you get a years’ worth of data that the promotion tests create, now TRADOC and the research community have this new and extremely valuable commodity; raw data that only needs to be analyzed and converted to actionable knowledge. The Army can use test score data to determine what subjects to teach at NextGen PME, to continue to be created and administered by NCOLCoE and other proponents. Need a critical task selection board? Just look at raw test results from the prior year promotion tests, proponents will know in a damn hurry where deficiencies and shortcomings are. No more pet projects or “just in case training” being forced into POIs, as long as leaders hold the line on what gets allowed into course management plans and restrict insertions to test result priorities.

When the Army studied returning back to testing prior to 911 some of the biggest concerns we voiced was that the institution could not keep up with the changing dynamics within the force to keep the testing relevant and secure. That was the same in 1982, and unless you think history does not repeat itself, you can bet without intervention it will happen again in 2025. I have held out hope that as technology and the way we manage knowledge would bring about improvements to our testing capability. The plain facts are that military service and the tools of our trade keep getting more complicated. And after continued cuts our personnel and education systems that were never properly resourced in the first place to keep up with the changes in the operational force unfairly never seem to catch up.

We need competency testing, but it's going to take a major change to how we select, promote and educate NCOs, and it may need to be in an entirely new model compared to what we have been using for generations. Is it time to let go of the centralized and semi promotion systems and finally break through resistance to promotion testing first, and then pick a route for testing that uses industry leaders instead of trying to “roll our own” on the cheap? And unless we consider the size and the scale of the entire Army NCO corps, active, guard and reserve, and the resources it takes to manage testing for a cohort of that size, it is not until all that is considered that you begin to see how truly underfunded NCOPD has been. Let us test but make it right from the get-go, as a barrier to promotion.

Dan
/Topsarge

(U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Amanda Hunt taken Sept. 11, 2019) U.S. Army Command Sgt. Maj. Giancarlo Macri, 31st Air Defense Artillery Brigade, provides guidance and motivation to a Soldier conducting field training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

As an experienced soldier having gone through all levels of Army PME for my rank, I was confident in my communication skills. To me, effective communication was all about being direct. With over 30 years as a military leader, I considered myself a communication expert. However, delving into my recent exposure to an approach to a method of communication labeled as “motivational interviewing” and learning and using its  techniques revealed that I had previously only scratched the surface of good communications.

It’s no secret that communication is the greatest challenge for any organization. Effective communication can make or break a mission, hinging on the comprehension and understanding of the message for bit the sender and the receiver. Practical and empathetic, motivational interviewing offers techniques to overcome filters and barriers in human language and delivery.

Motivational interviewing uses four key communication skills that support and strengthen the process of eliciting change talk, also known as OARS:

·         Open-ended questions

·         Affirming

·         Reflective listening

·         Summarizing

The use of open-ended questions that prompt thoughtful responses, using affirmations that boost value and confidence, reflections or back briefs to ensure clarity, and summaries that confirm mutual understanding. That is the bedrock of MI.

Motivational interviewing is a structured technique for discussing change. It’s a guided communication style that emphasizes good listening and respectfully offering advice. Instead of relying on external pressure, motivational interviewing aims to empower individuals who are resistant, hesitant, or just beginning their journey of change by tapping into their internal motivation. Its effectiveness stems from key principles: expressing empathy, rolling with resistance, developing discrepancy, and supporting self-efficacy.

I recall counseling sessions with soldiers where I felt I had done everything possible to make the sessions successful, meaningful, and productive. I believed I provided them with a clear roadmap to success, and it was up to them to follow through. On the flip side, I remember leaving counseling sessions with my leaders feeling like nothing substantial had been achieved. One take away is that MI strategies do not ask IF a person is motivated, but instead, WHAT motivates them.

Through motivational interviewing, I realized that there were many ways that communication as both the sender and the receiver could have been a more effective. In the end I may have been just a bit better leader to my soldiers, and a more receptive soldier to my leaders through better understanding the message they were trying to send me.

Implementing the principles of motivational interviewing would have helped me become more empathetic rather than directive. In hindsight, I realize I didn’t always take the time to understand what my soldiers were going through or how their experiences differed from my own. I needed to acknowledge their feelings and offer support and encouragement tailored to their unique skills and circumstances.

Whenever the word “counseling” was mentioned, it was assumed something negative would follow. Many times both my soldiers and I dreaded these sessions, aiming to get through them with minimal discomfort. Our mindset was more about “how do we get this over with?” rather than “how can I change behavior or attitude?” This is where rolling with resistance would have made a significant difference. Instead of focusing solely on areas for improvement, we could have identified problems and solutions together, considering multiple viewpoints rather than defaulting to “because I said so” or “that’s the way we do it here.”

Motivational interviewing has taught me that people are more likely to make lasting changes when they articulate their reasons and plans for change. Military counseling has traditionally involved predefined objectives with little input from the soldier, resulting in one-size-fits-all counseling forms. For a successful interaction in a military context, the soldier being counseled needs to do most of the talking.

As a lifelong learner, I now see that had I taken the time to ask and genuinely listen to the soldiers’ future goals based on their current circumstances, it would have been much easier to support and guide them. This could have been achieved by allowing the soldier to lead the conversation through open-ended questions, encouraging them to reflect on how their current actions and behavior would affect their future goals. This approach helps maintain a positive trajectory or steer away from a negative one. When soldiers realize discrepancies in their goals through conversation, it has a much greater impact than a leader dictating their goals and providing a plan based on personal experience.

In the U.S. Army, some organizations are dabbling in and using the principles of motivational interviewing. This helps provide essential training to equip the next generation of leaders with advanced communication and problem-solving techniques. By learning to master these techniques now todays leaders might have new tools on how to better navigate and address challenges more effectively than my generation did.

CSM (Ret.) Philip Johndrow,

Soldier for Life

Brigade uses new technology to advance Soldiers' rehab. Photo credit U.S. Army, Susanne Kappler, Fort Jackson Leader, July 8, 2010

With a hat tip to George Jetson in the futuristic cartoon that was his namesake,  finally our Sergeant Major of the Army hit the kill switch on an out-of-control treadmill that today's NCOs have been on. Unfortunately, just like the illustrators Hanna & Barbera, the architects of future NCO leader development may have not got all the details of our future precisely right. A result is that the NCO corps of late had been feeling run over, a lot like ol' George.

If you actually thought you would have a flying car by 2020 your expectations may have been a bit too high. So instead, in today’s post I want to look where we actually landed as we give pause and remind ourselves now, we should make time for a revaluation of what the future has become, and to validate Army requirements for NCOs. Let's use the pause to manage expectations on what PME is to be delivered to the NCO by the institutional domain, and when.

And critically, have we come to grips with the answer to the question: is PME to educate Army leaders, to validate operational experience, or by serving as a landing pad for unvalidated “training” requirements and shiny new objects? As we have seen lately, it cannot be all three.

Original Design

As originally designed, professional military education for NCOs was for the first time ever implemented in the wake of the Vietnam war as a three-level system of Basic, Advanced, and then Senior leader institutional training. The courses were touted as sequential and progressive and were intended to be delivered over an NCOs career, culminating at the Senior course. For the first ten years unit leaders determined who was ready for training, at what stage of the individual's development, and which of courses they would attend, and when.

Because of the low turnout at schools, coupled with credible reports of NCOs not being afforded an opportunity to attend these developmental programs, selection was moved away from installation leaders and responsibility assigned to the Military Personnel Center, today's HRC. Sgt Maj of the Army Leon Van Autreve once told a story that when he asked his first sergeant if he could attend an NCO Academy leadership course in the 1950s, he was told "you have been to combat. You know all you need to know."

Resourcing PME for enlisted members and providing them adequate time to attend has been a hot button topic as old as the institution itself. If we are not careful there are many among us who would be perfectly fine returning to those days again. Unfortunately, the programmatics of getting the right institutional training to the right enlisted leader at the right time of their career has again faltered with a much-needed modification to the previous bridging strategy.

In the recent announcement suspending temporary promotions  policymakers are reevaluating "the relationship between completion of a formal PME course and promotion eligibility." Before the 1985 decision linking promotions, policymakers had already been tinkering with the number and levels of NCO education. At that time there were five courses: primary, basic, advanced and senior, with a First Sergeants Course as level four after advanced, but before the senior course. Though it later faded away with portions of the curriculum migrating to the installations as a functional course for 1SGs and commanders, but in recent times a Master-level course has filled that gap.

Course, we have Courses

PME requirements since have not stopped at five levels. Originally touted as the capper to NCO education, the senior level, labeled the Sergeants Major Course, has merely become a waypoint for additional courses. Though considered functional duty position courses, the mandatory Command Sergeants Major Designee Courses, one each for battalion and brigade level Cmd. Sgts. Major are delivered to leaders at those echelons in parallel with the Pre-Command courses for battalion and brigade commanders.

Should one be selected to climb the ladder to the stars, a course for nominative-level enlisted leaders is held at the Army War College for executive level finishing. Even still, a joint "Keystone" executive course, originally patterned after the general officer Pinnacle course, is offered to senior enlisted leaders in joint or strategic assignments. These don't include parallel courses for special mission’s unit leaders.

And lastly, an entire series of "tweener" micro credits have been added as  distributed leader courses, six of them in total. NCOES, plus DLC, plus functional NCO PME, equals the NCO Professional Development System. Put end-to-end, not including any functional courses for duty positions (airborne, sapper, Ranger, etc.) or broadening (drill instructor, recruiter, etc.). The amount of time NCOs are tied up in institutional career training and development is under the microscope, and camps of thought by those least affected could prevail if not careful.

I fully understand the benefit to our Army and the soldier, of this PME continuum. I am an advocate. It is without a doubt an investment in the NCO corps that I do not take for granted because it is what distinguishes the U.S. Army from all other nations. Before these critical enhancements were developed through much blood, sweat, and tears by officers and NCOs of previous generations who built the infrastructure, early NCO education lacked today’s academic rigor. For 10 years the culminating problem at an NCO Academy was a leaders reaction course on how to successfully lead a team to navigate and assemble a wheeled car and a barrel over and through an obstacle.

Keeping Education in NCO PME

Today enlisted leader training follows a standardized rubric that has been matured at modern institutions of higher learning. In many cases the detail of instruction, by grade and position, is academically comparable to colleges and universities across the nation. Combined, now this continuum of learning not only results in a DA Form 87 Certificate of Training, but often baccalaureate level credits, or even feed into a college degree.

As good as the news was, last week there was a crack in the mortar that has attempted to hold all of these advances together. And that was the decision to suspend temporary promotions and reduce the crippling pressure on the force to get NCOs to school in order to meet Select, Train, Educate, and Promote goals that sprang from NCO 2020 STEP initiatives.

From my unique vantage point, I am not sure in looking end to end if what we have today has it right, and I have come to ask myself maybe we have gone too far in requirements for NCO PME? Five levels, 3 functional courses and 6 DLCs (that apparently are in some sort of quasi limbo). All tied to promotions, albeit with the recent safety valve release in the SMA Sends message shifting course requirements 1 grade later in a career. If you know the answer, ask yourself if the enlisted leader cohort is the only one with such academic rigor required in our mandatory career professional development, and if so, then why?

One plausible reason the SMA had to call a "cease fire" may be a case of a self-inflicted casualty; an over investment in the wrong areas of leader development, PME for the sake of it, instead of need. Going into Operation Desert Storm many said the Army NCO was the best trained, best led, and most educated. Some would say the same for the Global War on Terror. Likely, but also true, is that the NCO of today is equally capable. As a student of NCO history, it is my belief that today's overburdened NCO is capable of STEP but  cannot keep up with all the demands being placed on them from the three leader development domains, so something has got to give.

During this pause a fundamental question must be debated and that is to refine what competencies the Army requires of NCOs at each echelon and grade, and then develop to those requirements. PME is being constructed around the NCO Common Core Competencies, yet policymakers have drawn out a 4x6 NCO development model, along with the Leader Requirements Model, in a one size fits all approach without fidelity across echelons. The generic LRM does not consider the lack of authority afforded to the NCO Support Channel by Army Command Policy, which causes friction when NCOs take action. Developing a competency is wasteful if it is not to be used, and authority for action is dependent on commander, location, higher commanders’ intent, and local policy.

Redefining Requirements, not $$$

Select, train, promote and educate has merit, but tempo has not allowed the Army to implement it, and at current pace, was spiraling. Maybe instead of attempting to wrap STEP around the NCO Corps, instead we dial it, and NCOPDS, back a bit. While Tempo is high let's trust the T part of STEP, and rely less on the E. To do that requires trust, and that is trust that the policymakers will not ravage PME funding, never to return again. Investments made in the institutions must remain and be temporarily remissioned, not unfunded and  dismantled.

My belief is that senior NCOs will come together like the commanding generals of TRADOC and FORSCOM did last week. I recall during my time in service there was much hand wringing by Luddites who instead of transformative thought demanded "just in case" training in PME. In our basic PME course, then known as Warrior Leaders Course and others, we were devoting an inordinate amount of our professional military education academic hours on skill level one training, or in validating unit responsibilities. My buddy and fellow PME curriculum developer at USASMA SGM Felix Sanchez would rhetorically ask, “we spend so much time getting back to the basics, when the hell do we make time for the advanced [stuff]?”

You see, back in the good old days we would conduct fitness tests, weapons marksmanship, and evaluate dismounted land navigation skills using a lensatic compass, a map and a protractor because during Airland Battle our adversaries would surely deny our use of air space based advanced technologies. Meanwhile, while those debates went on, we had already fielded portable satellites, gps systems, blue force trackers, we had command and control systems on the move, WIN-T, jammers, and mobile subscriber networks, among other things. We didn’t offer training of any sort on skills using those items that NCOs were sure to come in contact with. So, the arguments were always exhausting, and many of those voices seemed to carry the day.

But today's Army is so much smarter, and our tech and our advancements much farther along, notwithstanding observations of future large-scale contingencies seen during actions in Ukraine and Gaza. I am sure glad those Luddites are gone and that we have moved on to bigger challenges in our PME. I think we are finally ready to meet George Jetson.

Dan

CSM Dan Elder, USA, Retired
@dandotelder